Power may be described as the “state’s ability to control, or at least influence other states or the
outcome of events” (Griffiths, O’Callaghan, and Roach, 2008: 258).

Joseph Nye has classified power as “soft power,” “hard power,” and “smart power.” Hard power is the use of coercion and payment; soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction; smart power is the combination of the tools of both hard power and soft power

Before discussing what makes a state a great power, it may be helpful to reflect on whether the
concept of ‘great power’ can be used interchangebly with concepts such as ‘superpower’ and ‘hegemon’. The concept of great power may refer to superpower, as was the case during the Cold
War. However, great power also refers to hegemon, if there is only one great power dominating the international system.Looking at the polarity in the system, Welch and Nye conclude that “we usually call the strongest country within a unipolar system a hegemon (from the Greek meaning “leader”); we call the strongest countries in a modern bipolar system superpowers; and we call the strongest countries within multipolar systems great powers” (Welch and Nye, 2013: 53).

It was W.T.R. Fox, who first used the concept ‘superpower’ in 1944 in his book entitled “The Super Powers: The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union - Their Responsibility for Peace” (Fox, 1944). The concept of ‘superpowers’ was used for the position of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War- the two states that had a global reach, a preponderant military capacity especially in terms of nuclear proliferation, and an economic and strategic role within their respective ideological bloc or the sphere of influence (Heywood, 2011:9). Then, it is plausible to say that the concept of ‘superpower’ has replaced the traditional concept of ‘great power’ in world politics (Bull, 2012:197). 

Heywood notes that a great power is “deemed to rank amongst the most powerful in a hierarchical state-system” and identifies four criteria for being a member of this so-called “great power club”:                                                                                                                           • “Great powers are in the first rank ofmilitary prowess, having the capacity to maintain their own security and, potentially, to influence other powers.
 • They are economically powerful states; although (as Japan shows) this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for great power status.
 • They have global, and not merely regional, spheres of interests.
 • They adopt a ‘forward’ foreign policy and have actual, and not merely potential, impact on international affairs” (Heywood, 2011: 7).

According to Hedley Bull, great powers “manage their relations with one another in the interest of international order” through: “(i) preserving the general balance of power, (ii) seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another, and (iii) seeking to limit or contain wars among one another. They exploit their preponderance in relation to the rest of international society by (iv) unilaterally exploiting their local preponderance, (v) agreeing to respect one another’s spheres of influence, and (vi) joint action, as is implied by the idea of a great power concert or condominium” (Bull, 2012: 200).

The Concert of Europe is often provided as a prominent example of great power management. The Congress of Vienna consolidated the great-power status of some states. Following the Congress, the powers of the time, namely Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia and France, were remembered as great powers for the next hundred years, and the concert of these powers ruled the world. These great powers restored the European state system, in which many independent and sovereign states acted without any fear of conquest. This concert has been appreciated because it also prevented a general war in Europe from 1815 to 1914 (Wight, 1978: 41-43, Palmer, Colton, and Kramer, 2007: 430-431).

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union acted as great powers and referred to themselves as “superpowers in keeping with the enormous destructive capacity of their nuclear weapons and the global scope of their national interests” (Griffiths, O’Callaghan, and Roach, 2008:134). During this period, “politics in almost every region of the world were deeply influenced by the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States” (Mearsheimer, 2001:5).

The first feature is that it is better to have several great powers rather than having only one great power. From this perspective, the main mechanism that would sustain international order is the balance of power. Without such a balance, states would not feel that they are bound by some common rules and institutions. Obviously, this would undermine the very ‘international society’. The second feature emphasizes the superior military strengh of great powers. The third feature is the recognition of great powers by other actors- a feature that points to the cultivation of legitimacy. This recognition provides great powers with some special rights and duties to maintain peace and security in the international system. Thus, great powers are also great responsibles. According to Bull, even the most powerful state needs to be recognized as a great power by middle and small powers, because without its recognition, a great power would not be bestowed with special rights and duties (Bull, 2012: 194-97).

Great power management is a prominent factor in global governance that implies a managerial responsibility to sustain and promote international order. In this sense, not only for the stability of the international system but also for the sake of their own superior status, great powers “establish international institutions and arrangements to further or preserve their interests and positions of advantage into the future, even as they do not directly or fully control those future arrangements” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 58). This practice seems to have continued since the League of Nations era. In fact, the United Nations reflects a combined structure of sovereign equality of all members in the General Assembly and the legalized hegemony of the great powers in the UN Security Council (Buzan, 2014: 103-04). As William Inboden argues, “a nation cannot be a great power without at least having a significant voice as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank” (Inboden, 2009: 24-25).

Given the policies of the Western bloc during the Cold War, in the 1970s, Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany were the leading “middle powers” in Europe and the Mediterranean, while Japan was a “great indispensable” in any attempt to manage the balance in Asia and the Pacific region (Bull, 2012: 222).

The basic force model emphasizes the preponderance of material resources, and the force activation model encompasses the possession of preponderant material resources and the political will to exercise leadership (1984:34-35).

Ensuring other states’ compliance is critical for the hegemon. As Yarbrough and Yarbrough argue, “the hegemon is dominant in its leadership; but leadership requires followers, and the hegemon’s success depends upon its ability to lead on acceptable terms” (1992: 52). 

According to most scholars, a system with a clearly preponderant state (a hegemon) would be both politically and economically stable. Because such a hegemonic state, also with an interest in cooperating with other actors, can solve collective action problems through providing public goods and facilitating international cooperation (Kindleberger, 1981: 243-244; Krasner, 1976: 321;Gilpin, 1987: 74-75). This theory is known as the hegemonic stability theory (HST).

According to Gilpin, the existence of a benevolent hegemon is associated with the creation of stable international regimes and, at the end of the day, the “Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like Pax Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and security” (1981: 144-145).

In “the benevolent leadership model,” the global hegemon provides international public goods such as stability and peace. The hegemon bears all the costs of maintaining the systemic order, but it gains relatively less than subordinate states that act as free riders in the system. However, in “the coercive leadership model,” the hegemon provides international public goods but forces subordinate states to share the burden of providing the public goods and sustaining the international order. The benevolent hegemonic order, Snidal argues, involves a higher level of cooperation as well as positive sanctions (rewards), while the coercive hegemonic order is more about a high level of enforcement and negative sanctions (threats) (Snidal, 1985: 585-590). Snidal concludes that hegemony can be “benevolent, coercive but still beneficial, or simply exploitative” (1985: 614).

David Lake argues that HST is composed of two distinct theories: the leadership theory and the hegemony theory. Lake treats the benevolent leadership model and the coercive leadership model as two distinct forms of hierarchical relations (1993: 460). From this perspective, both theories involve some elements of benevolence and coercion. The benevolent leader bears all the costs of building an international economic infrastructure, whereas the coercive leader forces relatively weak states to share the costs and promotes the international economic infrastructure. In Lake’s words “the answer to the question of whether leadership is benevolent or coercive lies not in the distribution of benefits from the public good, but –at least- in the efficacy of international leverage” (1993: 468).

The anarchical international system refers to an international order without a centralized political
authority that is capable of imposing international rules and restraining the use of force by states (Waltz, 1979; Wendt, 1992). As such, wars occur in the system “because there is nothing to prevent them” (Waltz, 1959: 232). The anarchical international system is, in fact, a self-help system that consists of states who seek to maximize their relative power and secure their sovereignty through either increasing their own material capabilities (internal balancing) or aligning with other states (external balancing). In the absence of a central authority and of collective security, each state is responsible for its own survival in the system. According to Waltz, under anarchy, states need to ensure that there does not exist a single state (a hegemon), which would dominate the international system and determine the rules of the system. In such an anarchical system, it is difficult to achieve cooperation among states and severe power differentials among them may lead to a major war.

Therefore, in an anarchical system, many scholars consider a bipolar power configuration (bipolarity) as a relatively stable and peaceful situation than a multipolar power configuration (multipolarity). 

A state’s position within the hierarchy of states has been associated with that state’s influence in the global arena. “The greater a state’s capabilities, the higher it is in the international hierarchy of power, and the greater its influence on the international stage” (Griffiths, O’Callaghan, and Roach, 2008: 282). Within the hierarchy of states, a hegemon is at the top of the power scale while secondary powers rank below the hegemon based on their material capabilities and influence in global politics. Secondary powers possess a range of political, economic and military power capabilities and exercise influence in regional and global affairs. In addition, these secondary powers determine the stability and security of the global system through their influence especially in international institutions. Given the current global distribution of power, the United States is generally classified as the global hegemon, whereas Brazil, Russia, China, South Africa, and India are considered as secondary powers. Yet we should note that, within this hierarchy, the secondary powers play a crucial role in global governance.

“Global governance encompasses the totality of institutions, policies, norms, procedures and initiatives through which states and their citizens try to bring more predictability, stability and order to their responses to transnational challenges. Effective global governance can only be achieved with effective international cooperation” (UN Committee for Development Policy, 2014: vi).

The pieces of global governance consist of the interacting rules, norms, international law, international regimes, ad hoc arrangements, global conferences and structures such as intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.

Nation states, as explained above, may be classified into several categories: great powers, middle powers, and small powers.

Middle-range state in the international system may be defined as “one that is neither great nor small in terms of its power, capacity, and influence; and exhibits the capability to create cohesion and obstruction toward global order and governance” (Karim, 2018: 3). The middle-range states have an important role especially within international organizations. Although such states do not individually have a leadership role in international organizations, they are able to follow an effective policy when they act collectively. In addition, the middle-range states have some individual roles in the international system in foreign-policy issues such as coalition-builder, mediator, public diplomacy promoter, perception manager, and bridge-builder.

The role and effectiveness of the middle-range powers in global governance can be evaluated by
looking at the policies of the BRICS countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 

The third category of nation-states in the international system, in terms of the capacity and effectiveness, involves small powers. The only way they can be effective in international organizations and global governance is to act as a coordinated group (Karns and Mingst, 2004: 16). They need the support of a big power that has the capacity to steer international affairs. The V-20 group (Vulnerable-20 group) in the international climate change negotiations within the framework of the UN can be cited as an example.

This new alignment calls itself Vulnerable-20 because they are the most “vulnerable countries” to climate change. They are low-income or middleincome countries, their total population is about 700 million, their lands are mountainous or disadvantageous, their climates are arid, and their countries are affected by the rising sea levels. With the support from the European Union, as an organization that has believed in the necessity of a climate regime with normative, institutionalist and