Political, Social, and Economic Foundations of Turkish Public Administration

1) sociological (center-periphery and religion-focused discussions), 2) bureaucratic and state-centered, and 3) political economy (class-based)

a. the adoption of Western institutions and training, and creating a new economic system

b. centralization of power driven by the belief that the growing power of the periphery contributed to the decline of Ottoman power

the disintegration of the traditional order, marked by a mental transition from saving the state to establishing a new order.

First factor is the incompatibility between urban dwellers and the large contingent of nomads in Anatolia and the fact that, for the cultivated Ottomans, all things nomadic were only deserving of contempt. Second is the central authority’s suspicion toward preOttoman nobility and several influential provincial families, who were often associated with religious heterodoxy and were regarded as a persistent threat of rebellion. Third one is related to officials selected through recruitment from the nonMuslim population.

secularization process not merely as the separation of religious and worldly affairs but also as a broader concept encompassing education, law, economy, politics, and other dimensions that were traditionally constructed in the Ottoman period.

The first one is the thought of establishing an Islamic State based on Islamic Law (Sharia/Şeriat), the second one is to establish a state that is founded on a contract between a centralist state and provincial powers (as âyâns, derebeys, and feudal lords but not similar to Western conceptualization), and the third one is to establish a centralized bureaucratic monarchy under the absolute sovereignty of the Sultan.

In the Mahmud II period, a military academy (Harbiye) was also established in 1834.

The concept of statehood can be defined as those in administrative power determining and implementing the principles, norms, and values they wish to uphold in political, legal, and social relations. This definition serves as one of the leading analytical tools used by the state-centered paradigm to monitor the evolution of administrative mentality during Türkiye’s modernization process.

Restructuring was not different from the ones in other countries on the periphery in the integration process to capitalism. However, the originality of the Ottoman society was that the class struggle derived from the restructuring was grounded on a religious and ethnic basis. The battle between the bureaucracy and the newly emerging bourgeoisie (commercial class) appeared in the social project of bureaucracy, which contradicted the social order brought out by commercial activity and integration into capitalism.

The early Republican State could be characterized as both strong and weak: It was strong in that it represented the only organized force within the country; however, it was weak due to its lack of foundations in societal dynamics. Social groups and their potential energies were effectively excluded from engagement with the state.

Early Republican Türkiye functioned as a dual society where non-producing modern bureaucrats held power over traditional small-scale producers (Sunar, 1990: 746-747).

The first and most critical transition to democracy is the transition from a single-party to a multi-party period between 1945 and 1950. Özbudun claims that this transition was not a sharp break (rupture); on the contrary, it could be seen as part of the reforms started and controlled by the ones who had the power in the previous authoritarian regime.

Türkiye’s post-war landscape was characterized by an authoritarian political regime and an economic paradigm dominated by state intervention in industry and finance while exhibiting pre-capitalist agricultural stagnation. The bureaucratic elites initiated the decision to undertake the transition toward democratic capitalism. These elites were confident that the transition would not slip out of their control due to society’s traditional and disjointed nature against the integrated and centralized structure of elite power.

Özbudun (2000) defines the social composition of DP as a coalition among politicians who played an essential role in the single-party period and various opposition forces. DP brought together urban liberals and religious conservatives, commercial middle classes and the urban poor, and more modern (mobilized) sections of the rural population. 

The DP leadership saw the rural people in general, and the middle peasantry in particular, as the foundation of its support base.

Taşkın (2020: 279) characterizes DP as a populist entity that opposes elitism yet remains integrated within this system due to its origins in CHP. It also fosters personalized connections with citizens.

The DP government used patronage quite effectively. Especially in the first period of its rule, in the economic recovery climate mediated by Marshall Aid, it frequently resorted to clientelist relations to bind the people to the party more and increase its political support. Based on a partisan loyalty logic, rather than production, it is an expensive, but practical, weapon.

Between 1960 and 1973, particularly during the Justice Party era, attempts were made to remove civil servants with leftist tendencies from the bureaucracy and replace them with loyal supporters. During this period, as Heper argues, political elites against bureaucratic elites tried to convert the regime to a party-oriented political regime rather than a state-oriented political regime.

Heper (1985; 2010), at this point, focuses on the role of the military in fulfilling the space that emerged due to the decrease of the role of bureaucratic elites as state owners. After the 1971 military coup, the army’s participation in policy-making processes was institutionalized by the National Security Council. At the end of the 1970s, the owner of the transcendental state had become the military instead of the bureaucratic elites. In this sense, the military was critical of the party-oriented political regime that might turn to a radical instrumentalist form of state.

Just before the 1980 coup, known as Decisions of 24th January, started to be applied as a solution to the economic depression under the supervision of the IMF. The 24th January measures, prepared by Turgut Özal, were the first step toward transforming the economy in line with market regulations. For this transformation, Özal demanded a political and social order and stability because, within a fragmented polity, newly established agencies responsible for the implementation of neo-liberal reforms fail to achieve the degree of autonomy needed to facilitate the program’s rapid and effective implementation.