Turkish Foreign Policy in the Early Years, 1923-1938

There were four main reasons behind the status quoist foreign policy understanding of Turkey during the Atatürk era. First, it was a newly-established state lacking economic and military capabilities to pursue proactive foreign policy. Second, the existence of the Soviet Union as Turkey’s Eastern neighbor always kept Turkey alarmed and prevented Turkish decision makers from taking pro-active foreign policy decisions. Third, panTurkism was considered a utopia having a potential to disable Turkey and its neighborhood. Finally Atatürk knew where to stop in foreign policy. His main objective was to establish and preserve an independent nation state, and once he achieved his goal, he sought to maintain it rather than expand it.

The two defining features of Turkish foreign policy laid down by Atatürk are status quoism. Status quoism means attachment to and preservation of existing order. Turkish foreign policy makers traditionally perceive the West as an important center of power in world politics providing a set of important standards for cultural and social modernity, economic advancement, scientific development, political stability and democracy. 

Atatürk’s Westernism did not dictate complete obedience to the West. On the contrary, it was “Westernism in spite of the West”. Turkey’s War of Independence was won against Western powers. The Treaty of Sevres was forced upon the Ottoman Empire by major Western powers including Britain, France and Italy. Sevres dictated the division of Turkish lands into several zones under Western control. In Lausanne, Turkey abrogated Sevres and reclaimed its independence from the West. Therefore, Atatürk was the last person to encourage full attachment to the West. Atatürk’s was selective Westernism or Westernism is à la carte.

The pragmatism of Turkish foreign policy meant that Turkish decision makers sometimes compromised their Status quoism. Accordingly, Turkey acted against the status quo in a number of times throughout the 1930s. For example, in order to revise the Regime of the Straits and gain full Turkish control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles, Turkey pursued “soft revisionism” using nonviolent foreign policy tools, such as multilateral diplomacy to change the status quo. 

Overall, Atatürk’s foreign policy was defined by four main features: Status quoism, Westernism, Pragmatism and Multilateralism. 

The Lausanne Peace conference of 1922-1923 was organized to formally end WWI after Turkish victory over Greece in Anatolia.

Both the Istanbul government and the Ankara government were invited to the Lausanne Peace Conference. This meant that both governments would be seen as representative of Turkey; therefore, other parties at the Conference would have the advantage of playing the two governments against each other for a desired outcome. This would also create a sovereignty vacuum on the part of Turkey reflecting a deep uncertainty on which government would be really in charge. There was also another problem that the Istanbul and Ankara governments had diametrically opposite positions. While the Istanbul government led by the Sultan was willing to compromise for the survival of the throne and the Empire, the Ankara government would accept nothing less than complete independence and sovereignty over Anatolia. Atatürk therefore announced the abolition of the Sultanate on November 1, 1922.

The Turkish perspective in Lausanne was as follows: The recognition of the independence of new Turkey was the top priority. Besides, the Turkish leadership had two main priorities during the negotiations. First, it sought to prevent the Western powers from establishing a puppet Armenian autonomous entity in Anatolia that would violate the National Pact and undermine Turkey’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Second, Turkey aimed to consolidate its political and economic independence by lifting the Capitulation regime privileging Westerners in Turkey since the 16th century. The Turkish delegates were open to negotiate anything but these above points. Especially, they decided to leave the negotiation table without even consulting the Ankara government if the Europeans insisted on the continuation of the Capitulations.

At the end of the negotiations, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed at the Palais de Rumine in Lausanne, Switzerland on 24 July 1923. The Treaty dealt with five main issues; namely, Turkey’s borders, straits, capitulations, minorities and debts. It delimited Turkey’s borders except for Mosul and Hatay that remained under the control of Britain and France, respectively. The Treaty stipulated that the Istanbul and Gallipoli Straits would be under the jurisdiction of an international committee led by Turkey. The centuries long capitulation regime in Turkey was abolished. Besides, the Treaty officially guaranteed the rights of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Finally, it was decided that the Ottoman debts were to be paid by the successor states proportionate to their borders. Turkey therefore only promised to pay the Ottoman Debts involving Anatolia. Turkey paid the last installment of the debts in 1954.

The Treaty of Lausanne had three major consequences for Turkey. First, it ensured Turkey’s sovereign equality before international law. The new Turkish state would be internationally recognized as an independent nation state enjoying equal sovereign rights respected by others. Second, the Treaty guaranteed Turkey’s economic independence by lifting the Capitulations and arranging the payment of the Ottoman debts. The Ankara government determined economic independence as indispensable for the new Turkish state and denied any offers for a compromise from it. By lifting the Capitulations and paying the Ottoman Debts, Turkey would make sure that it would never fall into the orbit of any external power. Finally, the Treaty consolidated Turkey’s political independence by extending international recognition to the new Turkish state. Unlike other post-WWI treaties, the Treaty of Lausanne was achieved through diplomatic negotiations. It is the only post-WWI treaty that is still valid today. 

Mosul was important for Turkey in terms of security of both Turkey and the Turkoman subjects living in Mosul. There was also the issue of oil resources. For Turkey, the loss of Mosul meant the abandonment of the National Pact.

For Britain, Mosul was strategically crucial as it constituted a passage to the British dominions in India. Moreover, the oil resources of Mosul were the only source of income for Iraq to stand on its feet.

After the failure of the talks between Turkey and Britain over Mosul, Britain took the matter to the League of Nations on 20 September 1924. The League committee visited Mosul and controversially came to the conclusion that Kurds in the region did not wish to be under the rule of the Turkish Republic. Based on the recommendation of the Committee, the League Council decided that Mosul was to remain as a part of Iraq under the British mandate. 

The Sheikh Said rebellion allegedly triggered with the British support was influential in the League’s decision. Turkey’s main argument was that Turks and Kurds were living in harmony and they were inseparable. The rebellion was contrary to what Turkish decision makers were claiming. The Sheikh Said rebellion was considered by the European powers as a religious as well as a nationalist movement, reflective of the preoccupations of the Kurdish tribes to protect their “national and religious” identities against the Republic. 

Turkey entered into two regional partnerships against the rising Italian threat, the Balkan Entente in 1934 to establish a solidarity network among Balkan countries, and the Sadabad Pact in 1937 to secure support from the Middle East against Italy.

With the personal efforts of Sir Percy Loraine, the British Ambassador to Ankara, Turkey and Britain forgot their old rivalry and focused on heightened economic and political cooperation. During this period, Britain provided considerable economic support for Turkey’s industrialization. This helped decrease Turkey’s dependence on German economic might. For instance, Brassert, a British construction company was authorized to build a coal and steel factory in Karabük, although the German Krupp company offered Turkey a more profitable deal. Another British company, the Alexander Gibb & Partners constructed the naval dockyard at Gölcük and contributed to the remilitarization of Istanbul and Gallipoli straits following the Montreux Convention. Britain also gave Turkey a loan of £16 million to be used for both economic recovery and military build-up. The economic partnership between Turkey and Britain progressed into a political partnership especially after the King of England Edward VII visited Turkey in September 1936.

Turkey applied to the League to reclaim its sovereignty over the straits in 1936. Turkish government made its case with reference to the principle of rebus sic stantibus that means obligations of treaty are terminable in the case of a fundamental change of circumstances. Turkey claimed that the circumstances of the Lausanne Treaty were altered so much that the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty concerning the status of the straits were no longer applicable. Turkey put forward several key issues that compromised the League’s capability to protect the Straits against a potential aggression. First, the aggressive policies of revisionist powers including Germany and Italy along with the general process of rearmament across Europe resulted in an intensive ‘feeling of general insecurity’. Second, Italy changed the balance of power in the Mediterranean by remilitarizing the Dodecanese islands. Turkish decision-makers considered this act as a direct threat against Anatolia. Moreover, international system became more insecure especially after Italy and Japan rejected to be bound by international norms and treaties. Finally, Turkey argued that the unilateralism of Germany, Italy and Japan encouraged unilateral actions and repudiation of international agreements in other parts of the world. Overall, Turkey argued with reference to the principle of rebus sic stantibus that the secure environment at the time of the Lausanne Treaty disappeared and Europe became considerably insecure. Therefore, Turkish government claimed that the straits committee under the League of Nations had no longer the capability to maintain the straits’ security, and asked for the revision of their legal status.

The Sanjak of Alexandretta, which had been under the Ottoman sovereignty for a long time, was transferred to the French mandate as part of Syria following the First World War.

There are at least four important results of the Montreux Convention for Turkey as well as for international politics. First, Turkey restored the security of the straits and addressed a key security gap in its borders. The restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the straits helped Turkey regain its historical role as the armed guardian of the straits. Second, the renewal of Turkish authority in the straits granted Turkey a liberty to close the straits to foreign warships during a war. This increased Turkey’s strategic value in international arena forcing European powers to seek its friendship and avoid its enmity. Third, Turkey’s attachment to multilateral diplomacy helped Turkey gain a peaceful image internationally. Finally, the Montreux Convention won a good name for multilateralism and diplomacy that had been discredited through the revisionist policies of aggressive powers. The Convention constituted the first formal revision of a postwar treaty by peaceful means in the 1930s. 

The chaotic multipolar international system triggered by the Great Depression enabled Turkey to take a step back from status quoism and conduct a more assertive foreign policy remaining loyal to Westernism, multilateralism and pragmatism. It is true that Turkey suffered economically from the Great Depression and “sacrificed guns for butter” concentrating on economic recovery at the expense of military build-up. Nevertheless, the crisis and the anarchical world politics afterwards provided Turkey with a unique position in international politics. Turkey developed close relations with both the aggressor and the status quo powers at the same time without having to establish formal alliances with either of them.

Major European powers also raced into providing financial assistance to Turkey since they feared of losing Turkey to each other. Both Britain and Germany issued financial credits to Turkey respectively, in order not to lose it to the other side.

Atatürk was the mastermind behind Turkey’s successes in foreign policy throughout the 1930s. His foreign policy vision fit perfectly into the role of holder of balance. He refrained from joining any blocs and establishing formal military alliances. He instead aimed to form partnership with almost every major European power including Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union. He even developed personal friendship with major leaders including British King Edward VIII, Greek Prime Minister Venizelos and Iranian Shah Pahlavi. Atatürk also refrained from unilateralism and use of force, and this increased the credibility and international prestige of Turkish foreign policy. He always sought Turkish attachment to multilateral diplomacy both in the auspices of the League of Nations and through regional partnerships such as the Balkan and the Sadabad pacts. Even in the Alexandretta problem where multilateral diplomacy failed, he persistently conducted bilateral diplomacy to force the French government into recognizing the independence of local Turks in return for Turkey’s partnership against the German-Italian Axis. Atatürk’s genius which elevated Turkey into “a valuable and progressive member of the European body politic” was highlighted by a mainstream British daily The Times on 11 November 1938 mourning Atatürk’s passing.