Turkish Foreign Policy Between 2007 and 2017: The Strategic Depth

The Arab uprisings of 2011, particularly the Syrian civil war, became the most significant threat to both Turkish foreign policy and the strategic depth doctrine.

In his book, Davutoğlu describes a new strategic vision for a potential increased role for Turkey in the international system by reassessing Turkey’s strategic position in the context of the systemic transformation of world politics after the end of the Cold War. This new approach, strategic depth, aims to establish regional integration with Turkey’s neighboring countries which share with it a long common history. Davutoğlu puts emphasis on enhancing Turkey’s foreign policy capabilities by bringing a fresh look to its history and geography to underscore its true potential in global affairs.

Three main methodological principles of the new Turkish foreign policy under the AKP leadership were: vision-orientedness, systemic framework, and soft power. 

five operational principles set forth by Davutoğlu were:

• balance between freedom and security,

• zero problem with neighbors,

• diplomatic discourse,

• multidimensional and multi-track policies,

• rhythmic diplomacy.

The concept refers to the means of persuasion in international relations and a peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Davutoğlu underlines that in regional and international politics, Turkey has increasingly adopted a soft power rather than a hard-power approach by following the EU’s footsteps.

According to Davutoğlu, the “zero problem with neighbors” policy has a deeper meaning than simply resolving problems or improving Turkey’s relations with all neighbors. He claims that this policy aims to create a historical transformation in Turkey’s unstable and problematic neighborhood through establishing a milieu of friendship and cooperation that would serve the interests of all countries in the region.

The multi-dimensional policy refers to moving beyond security related issues and adding economic, cultural, and political values in policymaking processes to promote cultural coexistence. The AKP foreign policy makers claim that Turkey’s relation with global actors such as NATO, the EU, and the U.S is complementary to its relations with other actors such as Russia and countries in the Middle East region.

Multi-track policies emphasized moving beyond a state-centric understanding toward plurality in policymaking. With multi-track policies, Turkish business groups/actors started to play an increasing role in Turkey’s booming trade relations. Therefore, these groups began to affect Turkey’s foreign policy making by encouraging the establishment of economic and diplomatic relations with all regions to strengthen Turkey’s presence in the international context.

The AKP policy makers focused on Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) during the period between 2002 and 2007. The EU membership became the center of discussion in Turkish foreign policy during these years. With the stalemate on the EU process, Turkish policy makers aimed to diversify Turkey’s external relations especially in its neighborhood. Turkey’s new foreign policy principles (especially the zero problem with neighbors policy) as well as diplomatic discourse and multidimensional policies led to a rapprochement with countries such as Syria and Iran. Following the financial crisis of 2008-09, this diversification process speeded up, and the Middle East region became an alternative to the European market for Turkey. Turkey’s export to the Middle East was $3.4 billion in 2002, and this number increased to $42.4 billion by 2012.

On October 20, 1998, Turkey and Syria signed the Adana Agreement and established a joint agenda to fight the PKK and improve their political, economic, and security relations. Accordingly, the Syrian authorities expelled the head of the terrorist organization, Abdullah Öcalan, from Syria and declared that they stopped supporting the PKK. During the AKP era, the normalization of Turkish-Syrian relations gradually became more important. Turkey and Syria began to establish a relationship based on free economic activities and the free flow of people and goods. Political visits between Turkey and Syria were initiated by Erdoğan’s trips to Syria in 2004.

The elimination of visa requirements in September 2009 was another important element toward the normalization of Turkish-Syrian relations. In 2002, the number of Syrian tourists visiting Turkey was 126,323. This increased to 899,494 in 2010. The number of Turkish tourists visiting Syria in 2002 was 467,648 and this increased to 1,664,209 (including daily visits) in 2010 (Turkish MFA, 2011). 

Turkey was among a few countries that supported Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, and it maintained that Iran had a right to produce nuclear energy. Erdoğan described Iran’s nuclear program as “an energy project with peaceful, humanitarian purposes,” and tried to persuade Western powers for revising their biased approach to Iran. 

Some circles considered Davutoğlu’s new foreign policy principles and Turkey’s reengagement with the Middle East region, especially the rapprochement with Syria and Iran, as a paradigm shift (or an axis shift) in Turkish foreign policy making. Some scholars argued that the AKP’s foreign policy activism especially in the Middle East region was shifting Turkey away from the Western alliance and that Turkey was getting closer to the East.

The Arab Spring started in Tunisia in December 2010 because of growing political and economic dissatisfaction of people with the country’s leadership. The unrest spread to other countries in the region including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria.

Since the Arab uprisings, Turkey’s regional policy has gone through a transformation as the Middle East region occupied the center stage of Turkish foreign policy. For example, Turkish leaders were among the first to call for Hosni Mubarak’s resignation on February 2, 2011. However, as popular uprisings uncontrollably spread across the region, Turkey’s economic and political interests in the region were challenged. These challenges tested Turkey’s assertive regional policy vision. Turkey’s response became more complex in Libya and Syria mostly because of its economic investments and political relations with the Libyan and Syrian regimes.

Turkish-American relations have soured over the clash of interests during the Syrian civil war, particularly during the conflict in Ayn el-Arab (Kobani). On September 11, 2014, the U.S established a coalition with some Arab countries in the Middle East region to fight against the emerging jihadist group, the ISIS, in Iraq and Syria.

As a response to the deal, the U.S senate approved a bill to limit the transfer of F-35 aircraft to Turkey. With this move, the U.S aimed to convince Turkey to cancel its S-400 deal with the Russians. Toward this end, the U.S. government also doubled the tariffs on steel and aluminum. The Turkish lira crushed and lost almost 45 percent of its value during the summer of 2018.

The normalization of Turkish-Russian relations continued even after the assassination of the Russian ambassador, Andrei Karlov, in Ankara on December 19, 2016. Both countries showed a united front during the funereal by “insisting that the killing of Moscow’s ambassador in Ankara would not affect bilateral relations, or cooperation over Syria”.

Turkey played an active role in Astana peace talks which were initiated by Russia, Turkey, and Iran in in Astana, Kazakhstan in January 2017 to create conditions for reconciliation to end the Syrian civil war.

Turkish policy makers did not step back from the S-400 deal despite the U.S’s disapproval and warnings, and the first delivery of the missiles arrived in Turkey in mid-July 2019. This development would threaten Turkey’s F-35 program. However, Turkish policy makers are still committed to develop strong military ties with Russia toward strengthening Turkey’s national security.