This discussion can also be boiled down to the debate whether foreign policy is a function of interests or values (Oguzlu, 2013, 39-51). In case interests dominate foreign policy choices and behaviors of actors, states are mainly motivated in their external relations by the concern of maximizing their material power capabilities as well as ensuring their long-term survival. Here, neither internal characteristics at home nor the way how other states are ruled in their domestic affairs has a role in shaping foreign policy. Engaging others and responding to external stimuli is basically a function of the instrumental calculation of how much benefit one could extract from such exercises. 

Multilateral diplomacy is literally defined as diplomatic relations between more than two states. It is also known as “conference diplomacy” or “parliamentary diplomacy” because multilateral diplomatic relations are mainly conducted through conferences and face-to-face interaction between leaders or missions of states. Its origins go back to Vienna Congress convened in 1815 after Napoleonic Wars when European powers came up with the idea of balance of power strategy which sustained peace in Europe until WWI

Peaceful rise/peaceful development is the strategy that Chinese rulers have been pursuing in their neighborhood since the late 1970s.

The Group of 20 (G20) is made up of the G7 industrialised democratic countries, the five emerging BRICS countries, (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) seven other economically emerging countries (Argentina, Australia, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey,) and the European Union, which together as the G20 represent the twenty largest global economies, generating approximately 85 per cent of global GDP. Although G20 began as a forum to discuss global economic stability, its agenda expanded to include the discussion of other topics, such as global security, global health, development, gender, climate change, migration, and the refugee crises. The correct answer is D.

Another aspect of the Ottoman legacy is that diplomatic and foreign policy issues need to be dealt with secretly and behind closed doors. Open discussion of such issues before the public is generally seen as risky. Diplomatic issues require expertise. For a long time, only the state elites nested in bureaucracy were assumed to have possessed this expertise. The participation of civil society and non-state actors in the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy interests has been quite limited compared to liberal democratic countries in the West. Diplomacy has always been the privilege of state elites in Turkey. It is during the process of Europeanization and democratization that civil society has finally begun to acquire an important role in Turkish diplomacy. It is now the case that both elected politicians are more knowledgeable than before about foreign policy and diplomatic issues and think tanks have mushroomed as institutional platforms offering expert-help to decision makers. 

French statesmen Richelieu has formulated ideas on diplomacy like some authors in Italy. His theory of diplomacy can be derived from his Political Testament, in which he has penned political advice for Louis XIII. Having become the French prime minister in an age of continuous wars, Richelieu’s main concern was to establish peace and carry out peaceful relations with other states. The first significant diplomatic writer of the twentieth century is Ernest Satow. Satow owes his reputation in diplomatic theory to his book Guide to Diplomatic Practice, which was the first remarkable book in English language about the theory and practice of diplomacy when it was published in 1917. Another British diplomat who has contributed to diplomatic theory is Harold Nicolson. Like Satow he combined his experience with the history of diplomacy. In his book titled Diplomacy, which was published in 1939, a whole chapter is dedicated to the development of diplomatic theory. Another important writer who should be mentioned is Hans Morgenthau, who is considered the founder of international relations. Morgenthau’s theory, which he portrayed in his 1948 book Politics Among Nations, can also be read as a contribution to the theory of diplomacy although not dedicated to it. Morgenthau sees the quality of diplomacy as the most important of all the factors which make the power of a nation, since it is diplomacy that brings the different elements of national power to bear with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation which concern the national interest most directly. The last diplomatist/writer to be discussed in this chapter is Henry Kissinger. Kissinger’s famous work titled Diplomacy can actually be read as a history book and on many occasions he has been described as a historian. He does believe that international politics cannot be seized by only theoretical approach and for this reason the study of history is crucial. The correct answer is Choice D.

Bipolar international system is a type of international system in which there are two major powers that are significantly superior to other actors in terms of distribution of power.

Both Obama and Trump recognized that the U.S. should no longer play the role of global hegemon in maintaining peace and security. Contrary to the ‘hegemonic stability theory’, the US does not want to play the role of benign hegemon any longer. As for the relations with traditional allies, the key message the United States is now sending is that those allies should spend more on their security and defense. They should not take the American commitment to their security for granted. European allies should both speed up their integration process within EU and contribute more strategic and military capabilities to NATO (Haas, 2017, 2-9). Dealing with the challenges arising from the resurgent Russia, instability in the Balkans and the growing anarchy in the Middle East and North Africa is first and foremost the responsibility of European allies. What happens in these locations affect Europe more than the U.S. It is now abundantly clear that that the U.S. does not want to channel too much of its attention and capabilities to European and Middle Eastern security challenges. Rather, it would like to see its European allies pay much of the bill in such theatres. With Obama and Trump, the focus on great power relations came back. Dealing with China and Russia now appears to be more important than focusing on humanitarian interventions, counter-terrorism and democracy promotion exercises.

In the ad hoc diplomacy period, agents or envoys were sent to foreign states for different purposes. They were assigned by the sultan for signing peace treaties or trade agreements, peace proposals, carrying out peace negotiations or mediating between two states, negotiating the clauses of treaties, establishing or consolidating friendly relations, collecting debts of Ottomans, learning the opinions and policies of the states about the empire, declaring the change of throne, giving presents of the sultan, delivering letters from the sultan, declaring an Ottoman victory, congratulating a new monarch on behalf of the sultan, joining coronations of European monarchs, inviting European monarchs to certain ceremonies and claiming taxes.

Mediation is a conflict management tool used widely across a diverse set of contentious cases, running the gamut from divorce settlement talks to labor management negotiations to peace efforts between warring states. Regardless of the type of conflict to which it is applied, the distinguishing feature of mediation is the introduction of an outside or third party into the negotiation process between the disputing sides with, at least partially, the aim of producing a settlement between the two sides.

Ataturk’s Legacy

To Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic, and his comrades in arms, Turkey’s number one national interest during the 1920s and 1930s was to protect the newly gained independence and sovereignty as well as successfully completing the radical transformation process at home (Hale, 2013, 31055). This required the pursuit of a pragmatic, prudent and realist foreign policy, enshrining the principle of ‘peace at home peace in the world’. Turkish rulers tried to help bring into existence a stable and cooperative regional environment so that developments outside the borders would never have negative consequences on the ongoing modernization and development processes at home. In this sense, there seems to exist a strong degree of continuity between Turkey’s efforts to support regional cooperation during the interwar years through the Balkan Entente and Saadabad Pact and the attempts of the Justice and Development Party governments at encouraging regional cooperation initiatives over the last fifteen years.

Pragmatism also suggested that Turkey would do well to construct friendly relations with former enemies. Involvement in the internal affairs of other states and pursuit of expansionist and irredentist foreign policies do not hold any place in Ataturk’s diplomatic legacy. This is the main reason why any attempt at regime change abroad is very much criticized at home. Traditional Turkish diplomacy is based on the idea that states are independent in their internal affairs and Turkey should not be involved in the business of regime change or value promotion. Trying to solve national security problems through diplomacy and international law is another legacy of Ataturk. The revision of the Lausanne regulations on the status of Turkish Straits through the Montreux Convention in 1936, the incorporation of Hatay region into Turkey in 1939, and the settlement of the Mousul question and the border dispute with Iraq in 1926 are all examples to the use of international law and diplomacy in Turkish foreign policy. Diplomacy backed by hard power capability and diplomatic initiatives conferring legitimacy on military victories constitute the backbone of Ataturk’s diplomatic legacy. 

One of the earlier of these theories belongs to Nicollo Machiavelli. Diplomacy, according to Machiavelli, must be permanent, in the sense that states should have diplomatic representatives, at least in those countries that they have high interests whether they are allies or enemies. Still even though he himself was a diplomat, Machiavelli believed that military power was more important than diplomacy. But because not all states had enough military power to pursue their aims, they needed diplomacy. Diplomacy according to Machiavelli is based on deception. This assumption of diplomacy is closely related to Machiavelli’s conception of human nature which he defines as “For it can be said about men in general that they are ungrateful, fickle, dissembling, hypocritical, cowardly, and greedy.” The correct answer is Choice D.

Active Russian agency in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICSs should be read as Russia’s growing determination to offer an alternative world order to the one shaped by western powers. In Russian strategic thinking, the road to global primacy passes through the entrenchment of Russia’s geopolitical influence in Europe and Eurasia. It is where Russia finds itself in strategic competition with the West.

The end of the Cold War era paved the way for strengthening American primacy across the globe, as no other power was in a position to shake up the foundations of this uni-polar era for about fifteen years. The 1990s and much of the 2000s demonstrated that the U.S. was the indispensable power on earth.

Win-set is a term coined by Robert Putnam in his famous article that he developed a framework for foreign policy decision-making (Putnam, 1988). According to Putnam’s framework, win-set of an actor can be defined as any desirable outcome from an international bargaining process. In other words, any outcome within the range of its win-set would be considered as gain by the actor. The formation of this win-set, according to Putnam, is directly related with the domestic political dynamics. Therefore, win-sets that determine the foreign policy agenda of a country is directly connected with the domestic politics of that country, according to Putnam’s framework.

Geography is the Destiny

Turkey’s geographical location has always been the most important leverage in Turkey’s relations with other countries. Despite the danger of exaggerating ‘geographical determinism’, it would not be wrong to argue that Turkey’s diplomatic relations and foreign policy record during much of the Republican era have been deeply informed by Turkey’s geography (Aydin, 2003, 163-184). Turkey’s geography has been both an asset and liability. Turkey’s decision to join NATO as well as being in the crosshairs of global powers can be convincingly attributed to its geographical location. Being located at the intersection point of three continents, Turkey has continuously attracted the attention of other countries, notably the great powers which have had vital security interests in Turkey’s regional environment.

The United States defined Turkey as the unsinkable aircraft carrier during the Cold War. The Soviet Union wanted to get control of the straits and eastern part of Anatolia in the immediate aftermath of the World War II and this prompted Turkey to seek security cooperation with the United States. Turkey joined NATO in 1952 to deal with the Soviet challenge much better. Turkey’s efforts to become an energy hub during the post-Cold War era are noticeable. In its effort to convince the Europeans to the idea of Turkey’s membership in the European Union, Turkish rulers have continuously instrumentalized Turkey’s geographical location as a bargaining chip. Turkey’s geography has recently come to the agenda in the context of the migration crisis engulfing European countries. The migration deal that Turkey signed with the European Union in the spring of 2016 is very much the function of Turkey’s peculiar geography in the context of European efforts to stem the refugee flow emanating from the Greater Middle Eastern region. The main reason why the island of Cyprus occupies a very important place in Turkish foreign policy is Cyprus’s geographical proximity to Anatolian peninsula as well as the recent discovery of rich natural gas resources in Eastern Mediterranean.

The reason why Europeans could not easily give up on Turkey can also be boiled down to Turkey’s potential contribution to European security. Hence, Turkey is mainly characterized as a buffer-zone and insulator country by Europeans. Underlining Turkey’s potential contribution to the protection of the Kantian security environment inside the EU against the security challenges emanating from the Hobbesian security environment in the Middle East has decisively colored Turkey’s discourse with Western/European countries. Depiction of Turkey as a ‘bridge’ and ‘role model’ by Westerners does also relate to Turkey’s geographical location.

Turkey’s geography does also suggest that Turkey should always be alerted to potential threats posed to its security as well as maintaining strong and credible armed forces. Of all the reasons of military’s key role in Turkish diplomacy, the need to have a powerful army in this fragile and delicate geographical location proves to be decisive. 

An example of a negotiation process which is used as a tactic to gain time is the talks between the government of Sri Lanka and Tamil Tigers (Weiss 2011). The fight between the government forces and Tamil Tigers, a secessionist guerrilla group, lasted more than two decades and caused thousands of casualties on both parties. The negotiations between the parties were initiated once again in early 2008, yet the failure of the process triggered a heavy assault by the government forces on Tamil Tigers in early 2009. In May 2009, the government declared victory and Tigers admitted the defeat. Later, it was understood that the government of Sri Lanka was actually using the negotiation process which was relatively calm and peaceful to prepare for a final attack to defeat the Tigers decisively and annihilate the organization. In fact, it was clear that Sri Lankan army was mobilizing and preparing for the attack since a long time frame including the negotiation period.