Diplomatic missions and diplomats act under the protection of immunities granted by the Vienna Convention. There are two types of immunities: immunities of missions and immunities of diplomats. Articles 22nd to 28th regulate immunities of diplomatic missions. 

Bilateral diplomacy is conducted between two states, but, initially, these two states have to recognize each other to establish diplomatic missions and carry out diplomatic practice. Recognition means the acceptance of the existence of a state as an independent and sovereign entity in the international arena. Recognition consists two rights of a state: domestically it has to enjoy full sovereignty over its territories, internationally it has to be independent from any other state. Moreover, membership to the 0 (UN) is another criterion for recognition. UN membership is an indicator of global recognition and today almost all states with full sovereignty and independence are members of UN. 

Former president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari has served as a mediator in the settlement of various conflicts varying from conflict between the Indonesian government and Aceh region to Kosovo conflict (Ahtisaari, 2008; Perrit, 2010). In fact, Ahtisaari became a prominent figure in international mediation practices especially after his retirement from Finnish politics and took initiative himself to prompt international society to take more active initiative in the settlement of international crises. For his efforts, he was awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 2008.

Until the end of WWI, bilateral diplomacy kept its hegemony in the international relations.

During the Second World War, Turkey continued the multi-directional foreign policy stance of the interwar period and pursued the so-called active neutrality foreign policy (Vanderlippe, 2003, 63-80). Rather than siding with one side of the warring parties, Turkey tried to benefit from the geopolitical rivalries between the axis powers on the one hand and the allied countries on the other.

The time period between 1945 and 1960 corresponds to a bipolar international structure and a high level confrontation between the US-led Western liberal democratic countries and the communist countries of the Soviet block. Turkey felt itself under Soviet threat and wanted to join the Western international community in such a way to counterbalance the existential threat to the north. Following its admission to NATO and given the increasing tension between the two power blocks, Turkey had to pursue a predominantly pro-Western foreign policy course. The rigid atmosphere of the early Cold War years did not offer Turkey the ability to adopt neutrality and pursue an independent/non-aligned foreign policy course. Turkey’s maneuvering capability was extremely limited during this era.

For about twenty years between 1960 and 1980, Turkey shifted to a more multi-directional and multi-dimensional foreign policy stance as the so-called détente caused a softening of the bipolar confrontation between Western and eastern blocks (Hale, 2013, 104-134). Turkish rulers came to the conclusion that the pursuit of extremely pro- Western foreign policy stance of the previous era did not yield expected benefits. As the United States and the Soviet Union began to search for ways to live in peaceful co-existence, Turkey felt more capable of charting its own ways through regional activism.

During the 1980s, Turkey had to discover the importance of the strategic relations with the Western world once again as the change of regime Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan increased the tension between the two blocks. The second arrival of the Cold War era confrontation helped increase Turkey’s geopolitical significance in Western eyes. During the 1980s, Turkey predominantly followed a pro-Western foreign policy stance despite the emergence of some problems in relations with Western countries. Turkey’s maneuvering capability in its foreign policy radically improved with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. No longer feeling the pressure to the north, Turkey could pursue active and assertive policies in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East. Even though the evaporation of the Soviet threat contributed to the erosion of the strategic bond between Turkey and its Western allies, membership in NATO and the prospective membership in European Union preserved their primacy in Turkey’s strategic thinking. The pro-Western stance in Turkish foreign policy was also enabled by the US-led unipolar structure of the international system, the growing appeal of the constitutive norms of the Western international community as well as the perception of Turkey in the West as a successful role model for the countries that regained their independence in the post-Soviet geography. The 1990s could be seen as a period in which Turkey tried to strike a balance between pursuing a more independent/multidirectional foreign policy stance on the one hand and increasing its efforts to solidify its presence in the Western international community on the other. While the end of the Cold War seems to have increased Turkey’s maneuvering capability, the gradual erosion of Turkey’s strategic value in the eyes of Western/European allies absent the common communism threat pushed Turkish leaders to help reassert Turkey’s Western/European identity through NATO and the European Union.

The shift to a more multipolar system over the last decade, particularly following the global financial crisis in 2008, and the spectacular increase in Turkey’s material power capabilities seem to have encouraged Turkish rulers to follow a more multi-directional and multi-dimensional foreign policy stance. During this era, Turkey has been in search for more strategic autonomy (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009, 7-24). The relative decline of Western powers, the questioning of the Western model across the globe, the concomitant rise of non-Western powers in global politics and the onset of the Arab Spring seem to have all caused a shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy away from the West to the East. Turkey acting as a ‘central country’ and pursuing a ‘Eurasianist’ foreign policy stance became quite visible during this era. 

Considering its longevity and organization, the Roman Empire contributed little to the development of diplomacy. This may be explained by their will to impose their policies on others instead of negotiating. As Nicolson mentioned “…[Romans] they sought to impose their will, rather than to negotiate on a basis of reciprocity” (Nicolson, 2001:14). This, of course, does not mean that diplomacy was unimportant for the Romans. Rather, it had an important place in governing their relations with rival states in Italy and in managing their relations with foreign peoples after establishing their empire. However, as it is widely accepted that the contribution of Romans to diplomacy is much more related to the international law and is represented in the theory, not the practice, of diplomacy. 

Therefore, the first Ottoman Embassy was established in London in 1793 and this was a turning point in Ottoman diplomacy. Being aware of the loss of dominance and superiority over the European powers, which had become more powerful starting with colonization and continued with the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, Ottoman rulers used all instruments and institutions of diplomacy. The Industrial Revolution also played a serious role in the erosion of Ottoman power. With the accumulation of capital and boom in economic production, Western states hegemonized the international relations. On the contrary, the Ottoman Empire could not keep up pace with these developments and began to collapse due to the lack of initiative to adapt new rules and developments in technology, science, military and economy. 

The time period between 1923 and 1939 had a multipolar international and regional environment with none of the great powers having the ability to set the course of international developments, let alone imposing its will on to others through unilateral and coercive means.

Switzerland as a “neutral country” for more than 600 years (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008), offered mediation to Spanish and Catalonian parties after emergence of crisis following the independence referendum in Catalonia in 2017.

After mediation and negotiation practices, parties agreed on several diplomatic agreements which brought peace. Lomé Peace Accord, for example, is the peace agreement signed by Sierra Leonean government and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and its leader Foday Sankoh in 1999, which ended the civil war in Sierra Leone (Abraham 2001).

Whereas one group of scholars argues that foreign policy behaviors are mainly a function of intangible factors of material power capabilities, geographical locations, and external developments, another group contends that intangible factors of personality traits, belief systems, world views, ideologies and cultures play more decisive roles.