Chapter 5: Foreign, Security and Defence Dimension of European Integration

Introduction

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an integral part of the CFSP. The CSDP provides the EU with operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The EU can use these assets on missions outside the borders of the EU for peace building, conflict prevention and strengthening of international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. These missions are carried out by using capabilities provided by Member States (see Article 42(1) of the TEU).

Potential Strengths and Weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

When it comes to security, the interests of all Member States are inseparably linked. The EU made security a priority in its Global Strategy and has been working over the past years to create the conditions for Member States to collaborate more closely with each other on defence. A lot of progress has been achieved-more work will consolidate it.

Given its size and resources, the EU is an important actor in international relations. In this respect, it has the necessary resources to adopt efficient and effective policies within the framework of the CFSP. Among these resources are:

• The EU consisting of countries, each of which is considered powerful in international relations, such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Poland, has the capacity to play an effective role at global scale.
• The EU Member States, even the EU itself, have experienced qualified and comprehensive diplomacy.
• Among the EU Member States, France and the United Kingdom possess nuclear power.
• Moreover, France and the United Kingdom are among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
• The overall defence spending of the EU Member States ranks second after the United States.

The EU will be an important policy actor to the extent it efficiently uses its resources listed above. Within the framework of the principles and aims of its external action, the EU conducts, defines and implements a common foreign and security policy based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of issues of general interest and the achievement of progressive convergence of the actions of Member States (see Article 24(2) of the TEU). The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) imposes the obligation on Member States to endeavour to act as jointly as possible for the sake of the EU’s becoming an influential foreign policy actor. Member States actively and unreservedly support the Union’s foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and act in compliance with the Union’s action in this area. Member States work jointly to boost and develop their mutual political solidarity.

Despite these powerful and decisive statements laid down in the ToL, the Union faces a number of obstacles to Member States’ pursuit of a commonforeign and defence policy. Among these obstacles are as follows:

• The EU does not possess the characteristics of a modern nation-state. Therefore, not only it does not have a stable and longterm foreign policy strategy, but also lacks a “homeland” or “national interests” that should be protected.
• Most Member States do not want to lose or share their competence in the field of foreign policy, where sensitive issues such as “national sovereignty” and “identity” prevail.
• Some Member States want to maintain their special relations with certain regions or countries.
• Sometimes, differences of opinion on foreign policy arise among the EU Member States.
• There are differing national views on the defence policy.
• Decisions regarding defence expenditure remain exclusively within national competence, that is, outside the framework of the EU.

In conclusion, the EU cannot make efficient use of its resources in the area of the CFSP due to the obstacles listed above. The EU is considered a “civilian power” or “soft power” because of its problems with using its resources. Indeed, the EU acts as an influential actor in issues such as trade, finance, and environment. In addition to these, as “a normative power“, the EU, by endeavouring to disseminate its principles, rules, and standards, is able to influence global policy (Manners 2008). The EU is also considered a “market power” due to its being an actor that uses its influence through the externalization of economic and social market policies and regulatory rules (Damro 2012). On the other hand, the EU appears to be an unpretentious actor in “traditional” areas such as political and military matters, or in the field of “hard” foreign policy. Yet, over the years, the EU is gaining ground in political and military areas and the CSDP is developing.

The History of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

In the EU, where cooperation in the area of foreign policy is not regulated by the Union Treaties, the origins of the CFSP lay in the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was initiated by Luxembourg Report (a.k.a. Davignon Report) published in 1970. Therefore, the Member States’ increasing cooperation on foreign policy matters since 1970 was realized in a temporary manner and outside of the Union framework. In fact, the EPC was initiated as a means of coordinating the meetings of foreign ministers. The EPC did not have an organizational structure of its own until the Single European Act (SEA) was introduced, and it was administered by the Troika. The members of the Troika changed every six months. This was a limitation to ensuring the continuity and making long-term planning within the framework of the EPC. This limitation adversely affected the EC’s efforts to adopt joint positions. The EPC made the EC and its Member States adopt not active, but rather a reactive attitude towards international developments. The fact that the EC lacked a common foreign policy and that Member States failed to act together in the face of international developments brought about the question of a foreign policy identity. The 1990–91 Intergovernmental Conference, with an aim to overcome these negativities, emphasized the need that all Member States pursue politically coherent and consistent policies. Member States believed that due to certain factors, the EC should immediately go beyond moderate economic sanctions or general declarations that often remained on paper.

Firstly, the collapse of communism in the Eastern Bloc in the wake of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union changed the balance of power in international relations. The elimination of the East-West division and the dissipation of tensions in Europe, strategically speaking, put an end to Europe’s being caught in the middle between two superpowers.

Another significant change was that nuclear and military capacity became less important, whereas economic power and geographic location came into prominence. In this new world order, international relations appeared to become more unstable, thus, more ambiguous. In an international environment, where the future of the European continent was full of question marks, the EC Member States took the initiative in order to give direction to the events and to have a say in shaping the future.

Secondly, one of the main highlights of the early 1990s was the reunification of East and West Germany. The unification process brought about political, economic, social, and cultural problems. Member States felt the need to manage the process of the unification of Germany within the context of the EC. The EC’s involvement in the process was seen as a means of eliminating concerns resulting from Germany’s past as well as likely political and economic turmoil in Eastern and Southern Germany. Achieving a “European Germany” was preferred to a “German Europe”.

The third factor was the 1990-1991 Gulf War, which started with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. In this process, the EPC, which did not include security and defence policy, caused a weak and ineffective foreign policy. In the wake of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the EC coordinated diplomatic actions of its Member States and introduced economic sanctions.

The fourth factor is the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia that started in 1991. The EC and Member States were caught unprepared by the crises and conflicts that erupted near their borders. Thus, they fell short in resolving conflicts through crisis management, and delayed to act on time. Even though the EC Member States contributed to the peacekeeping and humanitarian operations carried out by various international organizations, the EC lacked a clear policy against the crises in Yugoslavia.

The fifth factor was the increased intergovernmental cooperation with the SEA in the field of foreign policy and security, which was initiated following the changes mentioned above. The said cooperation served as the origin of the CFSP incorporated in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The CFSP constituted the second pillar of the TEU. In the roles of the Commission and the European Parliament in the field of the CFSP were kept very limited.

The CFSP-related decisions could only be adopted unanimously by the Council of Ministers. In other words, the EU would not be able to act if a member state vetoed any initiative or operation. The Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) strengthened these provisions in the TEU. The concept of constructive abstention introduced by the ToA is noteworthy. Constructive abstention is a system introduced by the ToA, which was established within the framework of the CFSP with an aim to allow a member state to choose to abstain in a vote without preventing unanimity in the Council. Thanks to constructive abstention, one-third of the EU Member States could stay out of a common action without vetoing it. In addition, qualified majority vote was extended to certain policy implementation decisions. The ToA also introduced the concept of common strategy of the Treaty of Amsterdam. A common strategy could only be decided unanimously by the EU Summit upon the recommendation of the General Affairs and External Relations Council. The Petersberg tasks defined by the WEU in 1992 were integrated into the TEU; thus, the security policy of the Union was strengthenedAnother remarkable novelty introduced by the ToA is the establishment of the Office of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy within the Council. The High Representative for the CFSP would also be responsible for running of the General Secretariat of the EU Council. In addition, a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit also known as the Policy Unit was established.

In 2016 the High Representative launched the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy to enhance stability in the European neighbourhood and beyond, boost security and defence and deal with challenges such as energy security, irregular migration, climate change and terrorism. The follow-up on security and defence has been particularly swift, with the adoption of a wide-ranging EU security and defence package in 2016 to see Europe take more responsibility for these areas. The global strategy set the following five priorities for EU action:

• the security of the EU;
• state and societal resilience;
• an integrated approach to conflicts and crises
• cooperative regional orders; and
• global governance for the 21st century.

Thanks to the developments mentioned above, the CFSP, in political and organizational terms, made a significant progress from the 1970s onwards.

Historical Background and Development Processes of the Common Security and Defence Policy

From the 1990s onwards, took modest steps in the field of security and defence. The weakness of the EU Member States’ military power manifested itself during the 1990- 1991 Gulf War and the breakup of Yugoslavia. The inadequacy of the EU Member States in military invention became more apparent during the Kosovo crisis in particular. During the Balkan crises in the 1990s, the EU and its Member States relied on the leadership of the United States and its military power. These experiences revealed the EU Member States’ need for their own military capabilities for conducting security operations.

The first significant step in the area of defence policy within the framework of the EU was taken at the Summit held jointly by France and the United Kingdom in December 1998. In fact, France and the United Kingdom adopted different stances on the formulation of a European defence policy. France favoured a defence policy that is more independent of the United States, whereas the United Kingdom attached importance to transatlantic relations and, advocated the implementation of defence policies within the framework of close relations with the United States.

Another factor was related with economic and management aspects of defence policies. Although Europeans’ defence spending was equal to twothirds of the U.S. defence spending, their army corresponded to only ten percent to that of the United States (Foster and Wallace 2000, 481-485).

The Saint-Malo Declaration is important in terms of ending the UK’s dissident stance towards the defence policy to be adopted within the framework of the EU as well as its assuming a leading role in that regard. The EU security and defence policy has progressed very rapidly since the Saint Milo Summit. Following many EU Summits, the ESDP proposals were adopted, and the institutionalization process started. It was decided to make up a catalogue of capabilities containing the pool of staff, experts, and military equipment and supplies pledged by the EU Member States to be used in the EU-led military operations.

At the European Council meeting of June 1999 in Cologne, the Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy was issued. The Declaration laid down that the Council, in line with the CFSP objectives and the progressive framework of a common defence policy, should have the power to make decisions on all conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the TEA under the Petersberg tasks.

At its meeting in Helsinki in December 1999, the European Council confirmed and clarified the content of the Cologne Declaration. Besides, a “Headline Goal” was set at the meeting. In accordance with the Headline Goal 2003, a European Rapid Reaction Force up to 50.000- 60.000 persons would be created, which was deployable in 60 days and sustained for at least one year in order to enable the EU to carry out the Petersberg tasks (see the 1999 Helsinki European Council Conclusions). The Headline Goal could not be achieved by 2003. In 2001, the European Union Military Staff was established for the European Security and Defence Policy formulated in accordance with the Treaty of Nice. These developments pointed to the relocation of foreign affairs from the capital cities of Member States to Brussels.

In the Treaty of Lisbon, there are certain notable provisions that contribute to the enhancement of the security and defence policy. The Treaty contains an article regarding reciprocal defence. Accordingly, in the event of any attack or act of aggression against a member state, other Member States are obliged to provide aid and assistance to the member state concerned (see Article 42 of the TEU). Furthermore, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was used since the Helsinki European Council meeting of 1999, was symbolically renamed, once again, to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Aims and Instruments

Aims

The EU, with an aim of achieving the following aims, defines and pursues common policies and actions, and works for a high level of cooperation in all fields of international relations:

a. to safeguard the Union’s values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity,
b. to strengthen and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law,
c. to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, in compliance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the objectives of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders,
d. to cultivate the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the priority of eliminating poverty,
e. to encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including via the progressive removal of restrictions on international trade,
f. to contribute to the formulation of international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development,
g. to assist populations, countries and regions facing natural or man-made disasters,
h. to promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance

Instruments

Aside from defined policy instruments, a number of nonofficial or unrecorded activities are also conducted in the CFSP area. The CFSP actions are carried out in various manners in a broad scope. The major policy instruments of the CFSP are common strategies and joint positions. According to the Article 25 of the TEU, the Union conduct the common foreign and security policy by:

a. defining the general guidelines,
b. adopting decisions defining:

1. actions to be undertaken by the Union,
2. ipositions to be taken by the Union,
3. arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in clauses (i) and (ii).

c. strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.

Institutional Structure and Decision-Making Process

the TEU has paved the way for decision-making by qualified majority in certain CFSP cases. Yet, even in such cases, any Member State may, on the grounds of vital and other stated reasons regarding national policy, prevent a decision-making by qualified majority. Another novelty in the TEU is the assignment of consultative role to the Parliament in the field of the CFSP. As can be seen, the CFSP decisions, other than exceptions, are taken unanimously by the EU Summit and the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament is not vested with the legislative power in the area of the CFSP.

The European Council

The European Council identifies the Union’s strategic interests, sets the aims of and defines the general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for defence-related matters.

The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers takes centre stage in the CFSP processes. Much of the Council of the Ministers’ work is administered through a layered structure of meetings attended by the representatives of Member States. This layered structure is as follows:

• The Foreign Affairs Council
• The Permanent Representatives Committee
• The Political and Security Committee
• The Correspondents’ Group
• Working Groups

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

During the preparatory works on the EU’s Constitutional Treaty, the Member States, in order to overcome the problem of the institutional limitation in question, envisaged to merge the Offices of the High Representative and the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs into a single Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. At the end of the debates, this new office was included in the Treaty of Lisbon under the name of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security.

The European Commission

The position of the Commission in the CFSP was strengthened with the Treaty of Lisbon. The High Representative, who is also a member of the Commission, presides over the Foreign Affairs Council (see Article 27(1) of the TEU). This enables the Commission to play a key role in the field of the CFSP. The High Representative assists the Commission by making more extensive use of policy instruments other than foreign policy instruments (such as trade policies, aid policies) in a more coordinated fashion.

The European Parliament

The European Parliament’s roles in the foreign policy area are restricted to counselling, monitoring and evaluating. It may have some exceptions. For instance, in cases of a foreign policy regarding a partnership or cooperation agreement, the European Parliament will hold an effective position in the field of the CFSP, since such issues are subject to the consent procedure.

Embassies, Delegations and Special Representatives

Due to the rapid increase in transportation and communication technologies and facilities, the role of diplomatic representatives, which are an important tool for the communication of a state with another state, has gradually been diminishing. Nevertheless, the representatives and diplomats continue to be employed in the acquisition and protection of interests. The EU does not have embassies because it is not a nation; however, it has a wide network of external delegations. Before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the EU representatives served as the Commission delegations. When the EU gained a legal status with the Treaty of Lisbon, those representatives became EU delegations. The EU delegations operate within the framework of the European External Action Service headed by the High Representative.

Institutions Specific to the Field of the CFSP

Since the CSDP policy processes are also an integral part of the CFSP, they are almost same with the CFSP processes. Yet, they differ in certain aspects. One of these distinguishing features is that Defence Ministers usually attend the Foreign Affairs Council’s meetings when the Council’s agenda includes the CSDP issues. Defence Ministers, albeit rarely, hold meeting among themselves too. The second distinguishing feature is that there are two more the CFSP-relevant bodies. Apart from the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff are among responsible bodies in the field of the CSDP.