Chapter 4: Towards the Transformation of Asia’s Geopolitics: Eurasian Heartland-Eastern Europe, the Trans-Caucasus, and Central Asia

Introduction

Eurasia is a vast region, stretching from eastern Europe in the West to the Wall of China in the East. Its western parts has had a specific role in the development of geopolitical analysis. What Alfred Mackinder called struggle to control over the “pivot” in 1904 in a paper submitted to Royal Geographical Society, later came to dominate the geopolitical understanding of the great powers of the time and much later the superpowers of the Cold War era. Simply put, according to Mackinder, whoever controls the Eastern Europe controls the Heartland, moving ahead in the quest to achieve world dominance.

Especially during the Cold War, the greater powers seem to embrace them in their policy sketches. Thus, the world has witnessed a struggle between the USA and the Soviet Union to control the vast area which might be properly called Eurasia. In the context of the Cold War, it was the scene of East-West strategic competition. In the post-Cold War era, it has become more complicated and difficult to manage.

The changes experienced in international relations since 1989 have significantly altered the political geography of Eurasia. The sudden emergence of the Central Asian and Caucasian states caught both the local populations and the world at large unprepared. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan became important outposts of US policy, while Korea and Vietnam became its battleground, and China was useful in the chain insofar as it quarrelled with the Soviet Union.

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union has changed this situation dramatically, putting the newly independent states of Eurasia firmly into geopolitical calculations.

The Central Asia and the Caucasus were part of ancient Silk Road, through which numerous types of goods travelled back and forth between ancient China and Europe. This was also where the “Great Game” of the 19th century was played But most of the 20th century, they were closed to outside intervention and more importantly interaction. The Czarist Russia and later on the Soviet Union insulated most of this region from outside influences. The ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed hitherto dormant social, political, economic, and geopolitical characteristics of these regions as they opened up to the world, which finally seemed to rediscover them at the same time.

Characteristics of the Region and History

The Central Asia and the Caucasus region of the post-Cold War era comprises in fact three distinct geographic regions (i.e., the Black Sea, which touches upon the Caucasus that could also be divided into the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus, and Central Asia) and one geopolitically invented region (i.e., the Caspian Basin) that linked them together.

Geographic Characteristics

The writing about Eurasia, in general, refers roughly to the area between the Black Sea in the West and Chinese Wall in the East, while its borders in the North and South are more fluid. In the West, some analysts only include three independent Caucasian countries south of the Caucasus Mountains while others embrace several autonomous regions of the Russian Federation in the North of the Caucasus Mountains. In the east of the Caspian Sea, some include Afghanistan and Eastern Turkistan region of China, while most confined themselves with five independent former Soviet countries, the so-called “stans”. Moreover, parts of northeast Turkey and northern Iran exhibit similarities with the Caucasus, parts of Asiatic Russia, northeast Iran, and parts of Pakistan also reveal connections with wider Central Asia. The Black Sea region provides even more confusion as some analysts include all the members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization into their analysis, thus covering Bulgaria, Greece, and Romenia, all members of the European Union, as well as Albania and Serbia in central Europe and Moldova, Ukraine, and parts of southern Russia on the Black Sea cost.

Geography of the Black Sea Region

The Black Sea region refers to a vast region from geopolitical perspective, stretching from central Europe into western shores of the Caspian Sea, and includes three Caucaisan countries (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) though the last two do not have a shoreline to it, and Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece (though no shore again), and parts of Turkey and Russia bordering the Black Sea.

Geography of the Caucasus

From a contemporary geopolitical perspective, the Caucasus is the region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea and comprised of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, though the parts of Russia, Turkey and Iran could be included from a geographic standpoint. The Caucasus Mountains, where Europe and Asia converge, separates the North Caucasus, which is made up of Krasnodar Krai, Stavropol Krai and autonomous republics of Adygea, Karachi-Cherkassy, Kabardino-Balkaria, North OssetiaAlania, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan within the Russian Federation, and the South Caucasus of three independent Caucasian countries. The latter was called Trans-Caucasus (Zakavkáz’je in Russian) in history from a Russian perspective, meaning the region “beyond the Caucasus Mountains”. The Caucasus Mountain range is actually made up of two ranges of mountains; the Greater Caucasus in the north and the Lesser Caucasus in the south. The watershed of the Greater Caucasus has traditionally accepted as dividing point between Europe and Asia.

Geography of the Central Asia

Central Asia covers the area extending from the Caspian Sea in the west to the border of western China in the east.

Russia is in the north and Iran, Afghanistan, and China are in the south. The former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan form the region. In 1991 it was decided that they should collectively be referred as Central Asian Countries

Approximately 60 percent of the region today is desert land. Central Asia is surrounded by the western Altai and other high mountain ranges reaching to Iran, Afghanistan, and western China. Because of the scarcity of water, population distribution is unbalanced.

Brief History of Eurasia

The Black Sea

Since Antiquity, when Jason and Argonauts went to its shores to search for Golden Fleece, it attracted wider European attention. It saw the dominance of the Byzantine, Ottoman, and finally Russian Empires that successfully closed it to the outside world for a number of years. During the most of the 18th and 19th centuries, the Black Sea saw a struggle for supremacy over the sea between the Ottoman Empire and Czarist Russia. Supremacy over the Black Sea was the main reason behind the Crimean War of 1856 and struggle to control the Straits created one of the most memorable battles of the First World War.

Russian maneuvering to gain control over the Straits, or at least to share their responsibility, during the Second World War had induced Turkey to seek membership in the NATO, thus bringing the latter to the region

During the Cold War, except for Turkey, the Soviet Union and its satellites surrounded the Black Sea, closing it to outside influence and interaction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Moldova in the north of the Black Sea, and Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the east became independent countries; and Romania and Bulgaria gained their autonomy from Russian meddling. This opened the region to western encroachment, which was realised largely by the NATO membership of Bulgaria in 2002, Romania in 2004, and membership of both to the European Union in 2007.

History of the Caucasus

the northern part of the Caucasus has been defined by its resistance against the Russian attacks and attempts to subdue its peoples since the early 19th century. The southern part also witnessed foreign invasions and power struggles among the Russian, Ottoman, and Persian states until the end of the First World War, when finally the Soviet Union was able to consolidate its control both in the north and south of the Caucasus Mountains. Along the way, however, following the 1917 Revolution and the withdrawal of the Russian forces from the region, the South Caucasian people were able to unify into a single political entity as the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic between 9 April 1918 to 26 May 1918 and later as the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic from 12 March 1922 to 5 December 1936. Later, however, they were incorporated into the Soviet Union.

During the Second World War, the Northern Caucasus witnessed intense conflicts between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and significant parts of the Northern Caucasus were occupied by German forces. Though they had to withdraw after the Battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943), cooperation of some of the local peoples with German forces led to forceful removal of various ethnic groups from the region by the Stalinist Russia after the war.

While the direct control of the South Caucasus by Russia came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union, finally allowing the independence of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, the North Caucasus remains part of the Russian Federation.

History of the Central Asia

The history of the Central Asia dates back to the late Pleistocene Epoch, approximately 25,000 to 35,000 years ago. The Cimmerians and Scthians in the west and the Hsiung-nu people in the east were the first distinguishable human groups in the region. In the 6th century, the first Turkic people established an empire that had a large impact on the region’s ethnic character. The Uighurs, another Turkic people, became dominant in the 8th century, and Khitans and then Karakhanids, closely related to the Uighurs, ruled later on. From the beginning of the 11th century, Islamisation of the region started and was completed by the 15th century. In the meantime, the Mongols established their overall control over almost all of the Central Asia by the 13th century, prior to the conquests of Emir Timur around 1400. As a result of the fragmentation of his dynasty, southern Central Asia became divided into several rival khanates. By the end of the 15th century, Uzbek people took over most of Timurid possessions in the region.

Starting from the 17th century, Russia began to encroach upon the region and continued until the last independent Uzbek khanates were annexed in the 1870s. After the 1917 Revolution, tsarist rule was replaced by the Soviet Union, which established five Soviet Socialist Republics in the region: The Kazakh S.S.R., the Uzbek S.S.R., the Kirghiz S.S.R., the Tajik S.S.R., and the Turkmen S.S.R. under Moscow’s control. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, all five Central Asian soviet socialist republics declared their independence in 1991 and became independent nations of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

Main Characteristics of Regional Countries and Problems

As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, eight diverse republics emerged in Central Asia and the Caucasus, in addition to two more in the Black Sea region apart from Russian Federation, facing similar problems. While the Caucasian countries had experiences of statehood before finally subjugated to the Russian/Soviet rule in the early 20th century and Moldova had a very brief independence in 1918, Central Asian countries as well as Ukraine had never in history experienced with a modern state system and did not exist in the forms that they gained their independence at the end of the 20th century.

Moreover, most of these regions’ economy, alongside their logistical and communication infrastructures, were connected to the centre during the Soviet times. Suddenly finding themselves independent and cut off from decades old economic and financial connections created important obstacles for regional development especially in Central Asia.

While Central Asia avoided major violent uprisings except in Tajikistan, the heads of states in the region were able to maintain a degree of continuity with the Soviet era governance by monopolising power and preserving most of the major political institutions.

On the contrary, the post-Soviet leaders in the Caucasus and northern Black Sea discarded the Soviet political tradition and the legacy of the old regime, and tried instead to replace the old system with the new power bases and institutions. Their challenges to the previous political order resulted in a number of violent clashes, uprisings and, in some cases, civil war.

Ethnic Differences

Before the Soviet Union, people in the region mainly identified themselves with their family, clan, tribe, locality and sometimes religion. However, with the creation of five soviet socialist republics in Central Asia, three in the Caucasus, and two in northern Black Sea, the issue of national identities became complicated as the central governments started to suppress any distinction that challenge the supremacy of communist ideology, even in the identity sphere. The borders of the union republics, particularly in Central Asia and the northern Black Sea, did not aim to create homogeneous republics or confirm with historic quasi-identities. Instead, they divided people and endeavoured to replace them with identities flowing officially recognised republic borders.

This nationality engineering produced a mixture of various local, tribal and ethnic groups. Strict totalitarian rule and suppression kept the destabilising character of ethnic and religious diversity under control during the Soviet era.

The Moslem peoples of Central Asia who had difficulties to preserve their traditional cultures under Soviet rule started to demand certain improvements in their status and culture. These demands created tensions over language policy with titular groups requesting their language declared as the state language. Naturally, this gives a preferential status in domains such as education and civil service hiring to the titular groups instead of ethnic Russians who usually do not speak these languages.

In the early 1920s, the central authorities in Moscow did not consider local ethnic identities while drawing the political boundaries of the union republics of the USSR in Central Asia. Despite having single social, political and economic units for centuries, a number of territories were divided among different republics. As a result of Soviet policies, each of the newly independent Central Asian and Caucasian states inherited significant minority populations. For example, according to the latest numbers from 2018, 23.7 percent of the population in Kazakhstan is ethnic Russian, and there are more than 80 different ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan.

Even though each of the newly independent Caucasian states has its own dominant titular nation, each state also has a significant number of minorities. Moreover, while the majority in Central Asia is Sunni Moslem, the South Caucasus also has a complex diversification in terms of religious faiths that are closely related to separate nationalethnic identities. The Azerbaijanis belong to the Turkic race and the majority of them are Shi’ite Moslems. However, a majority of Armenians and Georgians are believers of two branches of the Eastern Orthodox Church. There are Armenians living in Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region is located within the borders of Azerbaijan while 76,4 percent of its indigenous population is Armenians. In contrast, Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, which is part of Azerbaijan but located between Armenia and Iran, is formed mostly of Azerbaijanis.

The Northern Caucasus consists of Russian Diaspora, alongside the non-titular populations of Cossacks, Nogai and a number of others.

Ukraine in the northern Black Sea has been an interesting case in that it was claimed by the Russians as the birthplace of the Russian identity, state and the Orthodox Church. The disputes between pro-European Ukranians and pro-Russian mostly ethnic Russians finally led to first occupation and later annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2012.

Similarly, in Moldova has been torn between pro-Russian, pro-Romanian, and pro-independent Moldova groups since its independence. As it became independent from the Soviet Union in August 1991, the part of Moldova on the east bank of the Dniester River created a separatist government and remained so since then. The region, called Transnistria, houses a predominantly Russophone Slavs-Ukrainians and Russians, and has been de facto independent since conflict broke out with the central government in July 1992.

Religious Diversities

Despite the long periods of Russian imperial rule and atheistic Soviet-era indoctrination, the influence of Islam over the Muslim inhabited lands of the former Soviet Union remained mostly intact.

The Islamic heritage of Central Asia was even an important political card, which the leaders thought they could play in international arena in order to benefit from a large amount of credits, grants, etc. Thus, all the Central Asian leaders have integrated an Islamic dimension into their foreign policies by approaching the countries as Saudi Arabia, Iran or even Libya.

However, they were also concerned too much with Islamisation as they concluded that it could complicate their secular nation and state building processes. As a result, the secular nature, as well as the principle of separation of religion and state were highlighted in the constitutions of all the independent Muslim republics. Thus, the Central Asian leaders have pursued a policy of co-habitation with a moderate type of Islam while preventing all political expressions of radicalised Islam.

There has been also a growth of political Islam in the North Caucasus due to unpredictable changes, disillusioned hopes, economic deprivation and high unemployment. As the issue became a concern for both international and regional actors, especially in connection with the Chechen uprisings, so-called Turkish model of development, rather than the Iranian model, was promoted by the West and briefly by Russia to prevent the rise of Islamic militancy and the Islamic-oriented governments in both regions. There was also strong shared opposition by Russia and Turkey against the idea of establishing a single Islamic state uniting whole Central Asia or the Caucasus.

Despite local, regional, and international fears to the contrary, political Islam has not made a significant mark on the region.

There have also been raising alarms against the growing influence of Wahhabism in Central Asia and in the North Caucasus. As a fundamentalist approach to Islam, Wahhabism expounds that the Muslims who disagree with the Wahhabi definition of monotheism are practising shirk (idolatry). As such, it justifies killing of other Muslims who deny the Wahhabi definition of monotheism as apostates. As a result, it is watched with growing concern in the region as ISIS recruited fighters from different Central Asian nationalities.

In the Caucasus, while two branches of the Eastern Orthodox Church form the main religious beliefs Armenia and Georgian, the majority of Azerbaijani population observe Shiite version of Islam.

Most of the Ukrainian population until 2018 belonged to the Russian Orhodox Church. However, as the Christianity is closely aligned in Ukraine with its national identity, after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, dominance of Russian Church over Ukranian Orthodox Church became an issue, and the Ukranian government decided to support the independence claim of the smaller Ukranian Orthodox Church from the Russian one.

Economic Problems

While Ukraine has a huge potential in agriculture, Central Asia and the Caucasus have remarkable economic opportunities having oil, natural gas and the industry that are highly attractive for foreign investment. Further, the Caucasus and the Black Sea regions are poised to become valuable transit corridors between east and west.

One of the important concerns regarding the relation between the natural resources and the regional stability is that gained wealth from the natural resources are sometimes used for increasing military spending. The redistribution of wealth within societies can also be considered as another potential source of conflict. Moreover, economic problems in post-Soviet countries have led to an increase in corruption. Drug trafficking and related criminal activities are another concern connected with the regional economic development.

Environmental Issues

The devastation of the Caspian Basin’s ecosystem and irreversible environmental catastrophe indicates to another precarious situation for the region. Together with the rising sea level and the flooding of coastal areas, there are problems related to increasing saturation and greasiness of the soil that depleted fisheries in the Caspian Sea. Besides, various forms of aquatic life are at risk of extinction in the Caspian Sea as a result of pollution, disturbances caused by the rushed exploration of the coastal shelf, and the development of offshore oilfields. Due to the concentration of hydrocarbon waste, the Azerbaijani coastline is already declared unsafe for humans.

Both Iran and Russia have stood against the construction of a trans-Caspian pipelines and opposed to oil and gas development projects in the Caspian Sea, citing environmental concerns. Russia has even offered a uniform environmental requirements to be implemented in the northern Caspian after the division of the northern part of the Caspian Sea between Kazakhstan and Russia. Nevertheless, other countries in the region have suspicions that both Iran and Russia assert environmental issues to block their exploitation of the Caspian reaches.

Another long term environmental disaster in the region is the continuing destruction of the Lake Aral. It was the gigantic diversion projects of the various rivers that flew to the Lake Aral during the Soviet period to support cotton production in Uzbekistan that cut the natural flow of water into the Lake and started desertification of its shorelands. In addition, the industrial waste that was carried to the Lake with rivers thoroughly polluted water reservoir of the Lake. Today, almost %80 percent of the Lake Aral’s body of water have disappeared.

Another dimension of the environmental problems in the region is connected with the Bosporus and the Black Sea. The ports of the Black Sea, together with those in the Baltic Sea, were the main oil export routes for the Soviet Union.

Sharing of Caspian Energy Reaches

Due to the rich hydrocarbon resources, the Central Asia and the Caucasus have drawn attention from the international community. There are both positive and negative effects of the international competition for access to oil and gas reserves and to bring them to world markets.

Among the coastal countries of the Caspian Sea, Iran is the least interested in the current developments of Caspian oil deposits because of its other oil reserves. Similar to Iran, Russia also has large oil and gas reserves and production capacity in other parts of the country. Among the newly independent countries, Turkmenistan has large natural gas reserves and is not currently interested in developing its potential Caspian oil reserves. It has rather preferred to develop an independent natural gas export infrastructure from Russia. Contrary to Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have focussed more on the immediate development and export of Caspian oil. The main reason for this was that most of the proven oil resources in the early 1990s were concentrated near their shores, which was deemed crucial for their economic and political independence from Russia.

Debates in International Law

The main issue was how to define the Caspian, whether a sea or lake, as different international laws would apply in each case.

Historically, there was no precedent agreement that could clarify a solution to the Caspian’s status. There were treaties in the past between the Russia/Soviet Union and Persia/Iran concerning the freedom of navigation, maritime activity, and trade in the Caspian. In this context, 1921 Treaty of Friendship was the basis for the bilateral relationship focusing on navigation and fishing rights, but it was not applicable for the exploitation of mineral resources on and under the seabed.

According to the original Russian position, the Law of Sea could not apply to the Caspian since it has no natural connection with other seas, rather, it is an inland lake.

There were however inconsistent signals from different government agencies concerning the legal status of the Caspian. In particular, the position of the Russian Foreign Ministry was in contradiction with the position of the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy. On one hand, the Foreign Ministry worked for a legal status that would provide Russia’s veto on any Caspian development. On the other hand, the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy was supporting the signing of contracts in which the Russian oil companies would participate. In 1997, despite the Foreign Ministry’s continuing disapproval, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy followed a softer policy for the exploration of the shelf in the northern section of the Caspian Sea.

The Azerbaijani position was in contrast to the original Russian position. According to Azerbaijan, the Caspian was described as the border lake.

There were also negotiations between Russia and Azerbaijan during the 1990s to have a joint operation of exploitation projects in the central part of the Caspian, in case that the Russian stance would become less rigid and move towards the border lake concept. Although Turkmenistan had earlier supported the Russian position, its position became blurred after the announcement of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil deposits in whichAzerbaijan considered its sector in 1997. After that, Turkmenistan has demanded full rights to the Azeri and Kapaz/Serdar oil deposits and partial rights to the Chirag oil deposits.

pute over where to draw that line continued. Furthermore, Iran continues to protests against the construction plans for underwater pipelines across the Caspian and insists on a condominium solution. Iran rather supports the transportation of oil by the existing pipelines through Iranian and Russian territory.

After more than 20 years of discussion and advancing several different legal positions and political compromises, the littoral Caspian countries - Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan – finally signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea on August 12, 2018, granting the Caspian a “special legal status” with 15 nautical miles of exclusive control zone to each littoral state for mineral and energy exploration, and a further 10 miles for fishing.

Discussions on Transportation

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the initial regional power vacuum pulled most of the regional countries and a number of interested extra-regional states into a powerinfluence game taking place in a rapidly changing Eurasian scene. The Russian Federation, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States, the European Union, Pakistan, China, Japan and Israel were involved in this multi-national and multi-level power struggle.

Russia prioritized the recovery of Caspian Basin’s energy resources and re-establishing its political influence. It preferred the establishment of a “northern pipeline” from Baku, Azerbaijan, to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk as the main transit route for oil from the Caspian.

Against the Russian insistence on the northern route, the United States, Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan preferred a “western route” through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.

Alongside them, other extra-regional players were also involved as the northern route assured continued Russian influence throughout the region, the usage of the western route would have provided for advancement of Western influence into the region. Thus, the United States preferred the western route to realize its wider Eurasian and Middle Eastern strategic priorities including supporting the independence of Central Asian and the Caucasian countries against the influence of Russia. As a result, it supported Turkey’s wider overtures towards the region. Notwithstanding, Turkey’s financial resources and political moves were proved insufficient in the longer run to prevent Russia’s neo-hegemonic resurgence in its near abroad.

Eventually, a number of factors, including the geopolitical considerations of the global powers, local security problems, financial considerations, geographic location of the main consumers, and the existing infrastructure, were considered in choosing main direction for oil and gas transportation from the Caspian Sea. Regional disputes, including the frozen conflicts within Georgia, in Chechnya, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, political instability and a lack of regional cooperation were both important in determining and later realizing the chosen routes.

Another example for the geopolitical and strategic considerations’ impact on the Caspian oil and gas development was the gradual change in the major powers’ position towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the continuation of the conflict aided Russia to delay, if not prevent, the construction of a pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean Sea, Russia also tried to keep external powers from playing a role in mediating a political solution to the conflict because of the concerns that Azerbaijan and Armenia, in that case, would escape from Russian hegemonic control over the region. Later on, when Azerbaijan nevertheless choose the western route and moved toward Turkey and the US positions, Armenia and Russia have signed a friendship treaty that allowed Russian military bases in Armenia and Russian forces in Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran.

On the other hand, Russia also modified its position towards Azerbaijan along the way under the influence of “pragmatists” in Russian policymaking and various lobbies and interest groups related to the oil and gas industry. The link between oil and Russian policy towards Nagorno-Karabakh has gained importance and becomes explicit after the signature of an agreement between the Ministry for Fuel and Energy of Russia and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR). The agreement was mainly securing Russian participation in the development of oil and gas resources in the Caspian. In consequence, Russia did not object to the Azeri proposal for the settlement of the conflict at the 1997 Lisbon meeting of the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Russian representatives acted closely with the West. Finally, they agreed on a settlement plan based on the principle of the status quo ante.

It should be highlighted here that not only Russia changed its position on Nagorno-Karabakh as a result of the Caspian oil resources, but also the U.S. stand has changed.

The reasons for these dramatic changes in American attitudes are based on its economic interests. While Azerbaijan was increasingly considered as a Westernoriented partner in the region, Armenia became a strategic ally of Russia with a military basing agreement.

Eventually, two routes were adopted to construct pipelines out of the region. The northern line was finally realised with the enactment of the Tengiz-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, while western -or southern- route encompassed three separate pipelines; i.e. Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. These were complemented later on with the construction of Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) in 2019.

Post-Soviet Geopolitics of Eurasia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a simple model for understanding the emerging Eurasian geopolitics appeared. It was basically a new version of the nineteenth century Great Game, including Turkey and Iran replacing Russia and Great Britain for influence in the eastern part of the region.

Weakening of Russian Power and Influence

Russia aim during the early post-Cold War era in the region was to preserve its presence and to remain engaged in the regional politics. Russia’s most notable activity in post-Soviet Central Asia was military intervention on behalf of the government in Tajikistan. The intervention was also supported by Uzbekistan and contributed to regional stability by preventing the spread of destabilising effects of a civil war.

Another Russian manoeuvring occurred in the Caucasus, where Russia supported Armenia in the NagornoKarabakh conflict as a lever against Azerbaijan. Similar policies were followed against Georgia by supporting Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists.

The second Russian operation in Chechnya represented a strategic decision indicating the Soviet disintegration had reached its limit and Chechnya would not be permitted to become independent.

The rivalry among the power structures within the Russian state complicated its armed intervention in Chechnya. One of the results of the intervention between 1994 and 1996 in Chechnya was an embarrassing defeat despite remarkable human loses.

Russian attitude was perceived as an overreaction to the threats or the loss of its traditional sphere of influence, which was later proved once again in August 2008 when Russia fought off Georgian move into South Ossetia and later recognized the declarations of independence from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Other areas of Russian involvement in regional politics took place in northern Black Sea, where Russia formed a peacekeeping force between central government in Moldova and its breakaway Transnistria region. Similarly, Russia has been very much active in eastern Ukraine where various groups have been agitating for separation since early 2000s.

Apart from geo-strategic considerations, there have been two additional reasons for Russia to involve in Eurasia. First is to protect the ethnic Russians living in the region, and the second is to preserve its access to important resources.

Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Region

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, not only the West but also Turkey wanted to play the role of big brother to the Turkic states of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The Central Asian states had hesitations concerning the ability of Turkey to provide model specially for economic development. On the other hand, Turkey has become disturbed by the half-hearted responses from Central Asians to Turkish overtures.

Turkey’s moves to establish closer relations with the Turkic states during the 1990s also raised questions among its rivals whether Turkey was seeking regional hegemony and/or revival of the old idea of a pan-Turanist union.

Not only the regional rivals’ reaction but also the Turkicspeakers of Central Asia and the Caucasus had negative reaction to Turkey’s emphasis on commonalities between Turks and the Turkic-speakers in the region.

Because of Turkey’s support of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Turkey and Russia faced each other menacingly, thus. the Chechen uprising and Turkish sympathy with the Chechen cause created stress for the Turkish-Russian relations.

Turkey did not only have rivalry with Russia but also with Iran during the 1990s to create spheres of influence at the southern portions of the former Soviet Union. While Iran was concerned about Turkey’s active role in the region aiming at Pan-Turkic hegemony, Turkey was worried that Iran would attempt to turn Moslem nationalities toward theocracy. However, soon it became clear that both countries did not have sufficient economic resources to dominate the region.

Turkey’s policies in the Black Sea region however have been clearly marked with an intention to avoid conflict since the early days of the post-Cold War era.

Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Central Asia and the Caucasus

There were three factors limiting Iranian influence in the region: It’s overwhelming Shi’ite population, while the majority of Moslems in Central Asia and the Caucasus were Sunnis; It’s explicit theocratic character, which was unacceptable for the region’s secular leaders; and Its confrontational policy with the West that was not attractive for the regional leaders who were seeking western economic and political support. As a result, Iran’s religious influence in Central Asia could extend only as far as Tajikistan.

In this context, the close relationship between Iran and Russia, and Russia’s perspective regarding preservation of stability on its southern border have played an important role. Furthermore, Iran had a geographic advantage over Turkey with its long contiguous border with Central Asia and the Caucasus.

China and Central Asia

Due to its increasing demand for energy, China was motivated to invest in the oil-rich states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, in particular in Kazakhstan. Trade between China and the Central Asian states has been growing based on cheap Chinese consumer products and high local demand.

Moreover, Central Asian leaders were thinking that close relations with China would help them to counter the Russian hegemonic drive in the region. At the same time, preserving some Russian presence in the region would protect the Central Asian countries from possible future Chinese demands and pressures. From Chinese perspective, its main concern has been its Uighur minority, influenced by the liberation of other Turkic nations across the border.

On a wider geopolitical consideration, China might become a major long-term threat to Central Asia if only China insists on continuing its nuclear test programme in the bordering areas. Further, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have in particular doubts about Chinese objectives since their territory was demanded during the 1970s and 1980s, while the area was still part of the Soviet Union.

Extension of Western Influence

Russia is already concerned of American infl uence in the whole of Central Asia and the Caucasus that reduces Russian weight and influence. In this context, the Western moves to expand NATO and/or the EU towards the region come under Russian suspicion

After 9/11, the U.S has openly stated that its interests in the region include “strengthening regional economic (and political) mechanisms, developing east-west energy and transportation processes, and providing support to conflict resolution efforts.

In addition, limiting Iran’s infl uence in Central Asia, supporting U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan, and promotion of American business interests in the region can be counted as other geo-strategic and geo-economic priorities of American involvement. Last but not least, the possibility of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Central Asia’s growing drug trade, and movement of radical Islamist from Afghanistan to wider world have been concerns for American policymakers.