Unit 2: World Order Proposals

World Government

It is an old idea in political theory that one authority can and should sustain order at the global level. Pax Romana and Pax Britannica , for example, are known as eras of relative peace and order in world history that was provided by a single power- the hegemon . We see the reemergence of this idea especially after the Second World War in the theory of world government.

World Governmentalists

Emery Reves , a prominent world governmentalist, has argued that the world as divided into nation states would inevitably be disorderly and war would be the ultimate means to solve differences among the nation states. Whereas historical forces such as international economic interdependence require global cooperation, the humanity has been trying to solve economic and social problems in a system of states divided by clear boundaries. The result is being the human misery and the deprivation of individual autonomy for the sake of national power.

Criticism of the World Government Approach

From a liberal perspective, however, world government may not be a sound proposal to world order. Its argument that the individual will enjoy freedom under a world government is dubious. A single government at the international level can hardly be conducive to the enjoyment of individual freedom, nor is it conducive to the promotion of community values. It is also in direct confrontation with a liberal pragmatic way of establishing the desired order through pluralistic means by a slow process.

Legalism

The concept of legalism refers to a world-order approach that considers international law as the exclusive means to sustaining and promoting world order. Although the endproduct of its proponents has been a world government or world federalism, they however, acknowledging the difficulty involved in this process, have generally entertained the idea that world government may be created by first establishing a world confederal structure. Federalism and Confederalism, so the argument goes, would and should be achieved by uniting the world around a common global law.

Proponents of Legalism

One proponent of legalism has been Hans Kelsen. In Peace Through Law, which was published toward the end of the Second World War, Kelsen argued that if the big powers were satisfied in their territorial claims, then following the war they could agree on a legalistic scheme for order. For the endproduct of that scheme, he stated that “it is quite possible that the idea of a universal World Federal State will be realized. Obviously, [however] at first only an international union of states, not a federal state could be set up. That means that the solution of the problem of a durable peace can be sought only within the framework of international law.”

Criticism of the Legalist Approach

Some scholars, however, argued against the legalist approach. First, the domestic analogy of legalists may be flawed, because, especially from a liberal perspective, order refers to the political management of group relations rather than either law making or enforcing the law on individuals or nations. Legalists’ starting point has been the domestic analogy, but they too have somewhat mistaken the role of the government in domestic politics.

Secondly, from a pragmatic perspective, one should ask the question what this world order, if realized at all, would mean for the individual’s life and for the nations’ future. Pragmatism looks at the consequences (to the “fruits”) of a certain rule for action.

Functionalism

Functionalism , as another Idealist proposal for world order, argues for the organization of international cooperation not along the line of territoriality but of specific social and economic activities. It stresses cooperative nature of world politics rather than international conflicts and, as such, addresses the problem of war and peace indirectly. The assumption here is that cooperation in economic and social activities would gradually help states to achieve mutual understanding and solve their differences, that is, cooperation in nonpolitical issues would “spill over” to political issues.

Neofunctionalism, one version of functionalism, has been mainly applied to the European integration process. Since the mid-1950s, scholars looking at the European example have argued that in fact the application of functional theory at the regional level may eventually create a peaceful world. If each region in the world were peaceful, then, we would have perpetual peace at the global level. Neofunctionalism as such has been introduced as the idea of “ peace in parts. ”

Cosmopolitanism

Starting with the early 1970s some worldorder scholars have come to be known as cosmopolitanists . These scholars have had such common views on international relations:

• Environmental conditions pose a threat to order. As a result, the state has become obsolete as a political organization and it should be modified and preferably transformed in the long run;
• A specific understanding of justice, “distributive justice,” should be achieved at the global level;
• A global community is on the rise and that community would help achieve distributive justice;
• In this process many new institutions both above and below the state level would be necessary to establish.

Cosmopolitanists

The domestic analogy of cosmopolitanists is that- since the domestic realm is somewhat orderly because of the existence of a community and that the state sustains order through distributive justicewe can create a more orderly world by establishing a global community and achieving distributive justice at the international level.

Criticism of Cosmopolitanism

Some scholars consider cosmopolitanism an improvement over world federalism. Basically because cosmopolitanism is not that naïve to hold that the absence of violence would itself bring about an orderly world and that order can be achieved without addressing social issues. However, cosmopolitanism has not been able to escape scholarly criticism.

Cosmopolitanists have argued that the state and the statecentric political view have lost their “normative relevance” because of economic, social, technological, and environmental changes taking place in the world, and so a new system of world order, other than a state-system, should be established. Yet, as we have discussed above, the state still fulfills critical functions. The second criticism leveled against the cosmopolitan approach is the cosmopolitanists’ notion of distributive justice. A social order undoubtedly requires an understanding of distributive justice.

Another criticism that should be leveled against the cosmopolitanism’s distributive justice principle is that a global definition of justice, without necessary conditions that would help bring individuals and nations together, would require an excessively powerful central authority that would apply- in fact, impose and enforce- that justice.

Collective Security and the Balance of Power as Systems for Managing Power Relations

Both collective security and the balance of power are, in fact, specific means to managing power relations in international politics. Here we use the concept of “power” in the sense of military power. As we touched on the concept of order above, order in narrow sense refers to the absence of war in the system, and the concept on which scholars have elaborated for achieving that kind of order is the management of power.

Collective Security

Collective security is a partially centralized system in that the possession of power remains diffused among states, but at the same time the use of force in the system is regulated by a central agency such as an international organization with a universal membership. In fact, “collective security is the name given by the planners of a new world order after World War I to the system for maintenance of international peace that they intended as a replacement for the system commonly known as the balance of power” (Claude, 1971: 247).

First, collective security prescribes a partially centralized system for the management of power. Although, states still possess the means of power, resort to force is regulated by a central agency, which is a general international organization such as the League of Nations or the United Nations. Second, in this agenda, aggression would be deterred not by an equilibrium of power but by a preponderance. As such, collective security holds that most, if not all, states must remain committed to the system to deter the potential aggressor, and, when needed, participate in collective actions to punish the aggressor. Third, although collective security prescribes imposing on the aggressor moral, diplomatic, and economic sanctions, its credibility as a deterrent relies ultimately on military sanction. Therefore, collective security is a hard approach to world order (Claude, 1986: 56). Because it requires willingness to support the words with deeds and a determination to frustrate and, if necessary, defeat the aggressor with military sanction. Fourth, collective security is a “one for all, all for one” scheme in that states are believed to be committed to deter and punish the aggressor, regardless of their own identities and the aggressor’s identity.

The Balance of Power

The most-often-used concept in the field of international relations is arguably the balance of power . Yet scholars have not agreed on a single definition of the concept, nor have they been consistent in using their own definitions. The balance of power have been used by scholars in various meanings such as equilibrium, disequilibrium, distribution of power, policy and, in fact, as a symbol of the Realist school of international relations.

There are two ideas on the balance of power as a system that deserve attention. First, the balance of power is a “fallback system” of international relations; in a multistate system, unless an alternate system is established for the management of power, it is natural for states to take care of their own security. Put differently, “the balance system is the natural international system in the sense that it does not have to be contrived. In the absence of a different system, states fall back on this one” (Claude, 1990: 35). Secondly, “the contemporary balance of power system is by no means a mere duplicate of systems which have existed in the past” (Claude, 1962: 281).

Has the Collective Security System Been Rejected?

Some scholars argue that collective security has been rejected as an approach to the management of power. Obviously, there has been no system of collective security in place since 1945. It is also true that the multilateral intervention in Korea and Iraq occurred; however, these were instances of collective reaction to an aggressor when and where the intervening nations’ interests converged, rather than actions done within a system of collective security.

Objective requirements refer to the specific security environment that the theory of collective security envisages. According to the collective security scheme, an attack in the system against any state will trigger the combined resistance of all other states. It is, in other words, a scheme of ‘ all against one; ’ a scheme for creating a preponderance of power against the aggressor.

Subjective requirements for the rejection of collective security refer to political and moral conditions that are necessary for the working of a collective security system. We have argued above that collective security is a hard approach to the management of power; it requires states, in the final analysis, to defeat the aggressor with military means. Making and keeping commitments, willingness to shoulder responsibilities, waging wars even though doing so may conflict with national interests, and putting world order before national interests are essential for the working of a collective security system.

In fact, subjective conditions are more critical than objective conditions for establishing a collective security system; without the willingness to pay the costs that collective security envisages, a change in the security environment itself would not create a change in the existing system for the management of power.