Chapter 1: Some Prefatory Notes On Turkish Political Life

Introduction: Theory, Method and Scope

The studies of Turkish political life do have, in general, almost common and apprehensible theme: the development of Turkish democracy, and/or the transition to democracy, a process which is basically conceived in terms of the formation of nation-state, institutionalization of bureaucratic rationality, and creation of modern civic culture in both directions (transition or development), but the prevailing theoretical practice mostly rely on the growth of parliamentary democracy in Turkey.

The students of politics should be aware of the fact that politics always works within the unnatural realm in the sense that not only politics is inevitably mediated by unnatural social and historical forces, but also politics is a constant struggle against naturalness of anything given. Therefore, our life in politics, our choices in political process are the direct consequences of our social existence, and this is something we should always keep in mind.

The studies of political life in different societies have examined political totality as the analysis of political process and political evolution in a determined period of time, which would have to be resulted, as expected, in some form of democracy, thus attached to a teleological reading of the political in terms of a Western pattern; and an articulation of political concepts and values into a given political reality. Therefore, it is possible to claim here that such a task has two dimensions one is based on the analytic, the other is on synthetic undertaking. In the first dimension, we have political institutions, transformations, processes, and values; political ideologies, concepts and visions in the second.

In the study of political processes and institutions, the connection among history, culture and economy, and their interrelatedness must be contextualized.

The Subject and Its Positions

The essential element in any given social and political process is the subject, who may be man or woman, poor or rich, old or young, educated or uneducated, conservative or liberal. The list includes an indefinite dichotomy, and it could go further.

Subjectness is not a permanent position, and it is not a solid configuration which does not change. Therefore, a “voter” is not simply someone who just gives his/her vote, and then settles down. A “worker” is not someone who just works at workplace and continues to do so. An ideologically motivated person in a political movement has also a daily life to deal with. A woman is not just a woman with only a biological disposition to rely on, but she has also other features to be defined. She is, for instance, also the mother of future of a nation to be called upon in a nationalist discourse, an emancipatory subject for feminist movement.

In a given society, due to culture and history, which is to be discussed below, we can probably find a lot of people like ourselves, and “our self” is always bound with other “selfs” in the same subject positions.

Culture and History of Turkish Politics

So Similar, So Different: Culture

Culture is a very powerful element in the formation of political in changing circumstances, but let us forget that it is still only one among many elements which do shape political conflicts. Kulturkampf (“cultural war or struggle”) is a specific term that indicates a specific period (1871-1887) in German history where state tried to gain dominance over church in daily life, especially in marriage and contract issues. The appearance was illusionary; this was not a conflict between “Protestant State” and “Catholic Church” but about who was going to decide even on tiniest trivial matters in daily life, and that political power, a central authority is executive on every issue in social life without exemption.

The cultural struggles are important aspects of Turkish political life since the political is always mediated through cultural and ideological practices, and in return, it mediates them.

History as Fate

Joyce, in his monumental novel Ulysess, is almost captivated by a fear of history, which is “a nightmare he is trying to awake.” This is very dramatic statement on his behalf, but gives us an insight what history could be sometimes: a heavy burden on our shoulders as wars, crimes, killings. But there are too many other examples that history could also be a source for national dignity, the ground of collective personality, and most important of all, a site for national enthusiasm from which nationalism as a political ideology emerges. history makes society, gives its uniqueness, and in that sense, only particular historicities differ societies from each other, and then later every society becomes a part of universal history according to its share in the ruling dynamic of historical development. History, moreover, is a persistent background to everything that happens within a society. In this sense, Joyce was right: no escape is possible from history, and thus in this sense history becomes fate.

The Turkish Republic was founded on the heritage of Ottoman Empire, which was, if one is allowed to say, in a process of “decline-in-progress” since the Ottoman State was economically and militarily very weak on the one hand, but due to modernizing attempts at almost every field from education to civic affairs, stayed alive for longer periods than one expected, on the other. “The sick man of Bosphorus” even was able to create a new state from its ashes after it had died. Modern Turkey has to deal with very specific issues which are undeniably related to Empire’s legacy, and which give Turkey a unique role in international relations.

Political Ideologies and Institutions in Modern Turkey

Political Ideologies in Modern Turkey

Islamism, Nationalism and Ottomanism were three modern ideologies that were employed by both state and intelligentsia to save the Ottoman Empire. With the proclamation of Republic, Ottomanism was no longer a plausible option, the secular attitude (laicite) made Islamism outdated, and thus nationalism became a dominant ideology in modern Turkey. Ziya Gökalp outlined historical and cultural principles of nationalism in his influential book, Principles of Turkism in which a Durkheimian idea of society was embodied. The Turkish nationstate had a strong desire for westernisation, and it exemplified reforms and quasi-revolutions in language, law, culture and economy. Nationalism was still employable, but was not very functional for all those westernising attempts, therefore Kemalism was invented. The Journals like Kadro and Ülkü added some folkloric and economic elements to it. Kemalism was not only official ideology, it also contributed to the cult of Mustafa Kemal (who was named as Atatürk, the father of Turks). Due to the fact that Kemalism was an eclectic and syncretic ideology, it remained very fruitful up to this time. The personality of Mustafa Kemal as the founder of the Republic is clearly an important factor in the continuation of Kemalism as an ideology, but to some members of Turkish society, this ideological orientation of nationalism plus westernisation is today still a golden key to political choice. Even for individuals who have strong religious sentiments and reacted to Kemalism in different ways in the past, Mustafa Kemal has been celebrated as a national hero who fought against West.

The relative transition to parliamentary democracy in 1950 opened the door for other ideological inclinations, such as socialism and liberalism, which both had a relatively weak tradition in Turkey. Then Islamism found a way to reassert itself. Liberalism remained limited to a few journals and people, but socialism especially after 1960 Coup, was rapidly progressing. Socialism was mostly a combination of narodnik populism and an economic program of independent development. Thus it entwined with Kemalism. With the student movement, it was transferred to the universities. Although culturally rich and politically conscious, socialism was still far away from its revolutionary subject, the working class. Islamism, deprived of its past in the Ottoman modernization, nurtured itself on translations from other languages, and traditional traits. The Coup in 1980 took socialism’s weak social roots down, and political repression made it unrepresentable. Liberalism, though not a main actor traditionally, became a hidden dominant ideology in the sense that a subject without politics, priority of individual freedoms and rights took place of social welfare, and market’s rule became main tenet of political discourse. Islamism, in this new climate, educated itself on a number of issues, found a class of intelligentsia who seems to have an idea of religion and modern society in contemporary terms. The long AK Party dominance after 2002 exhausted nearly all social movements and ideological positions, including Islamism to the extent that there is no longer a plausible alternative to the current conservative establishment.

Three Turkish Individuals: Citizen, Village Teacher, Imam

As national education spread, many families were able to educate their children. With a relatively open educational system, different social classes found a way for mobilization, and population was rapidly urbanizing. Those who had taken places in political ranks greatly benefited from this process. So education became important for not only public enlightenment, but also for social mobilization, and therefore education was shaped as a site for political struggle. Three examples may be explanatory.

The People’s Houses, The Village Institutes and The Imam-Hatip Schools are three different cultural-social and educational organizations through which Turkey’s quest for Westernization and the reaction to it, can be examined.

The People’s Houses was founded in 1932 with an aim to urbanite people, and to conserve and enliven traditional folkloric customs, offered courses in literature, fine arts as well as handcrafting, tayloring and similar practices. The Village Institutes (first founded in 1940) were also the mediums by which state tried to create a new model of citizen, and in which the different reforms aiming at westernisation could be socialized.

The Village Institutes chose their students from the successful children in villages, and they were educated both practically, and theoretically, the agricultural and constructional skills and classical education in language, mathematics and history were provided.

The Imam-Hatip Schools has a long history, which date back to 1924, a time when Young Republic was asserting itself in semi-religious terms, as secularity as a state politics gained momentum, they were closed down. During the last years of one-party period, Republican People Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) reopened the İmam-Hatip Schools; and when Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) won elections in 1950, they were established at middle school and high school levels in almost every part of country. The İmam-Hatip Schools had a strong religious curriculum, but at the same time the schools provided general studies like secular educational institutions.

The People’s House was home for secular, urbanite citizen, The Village Institutes was there to create the enlightening/enlightened pioneer for rural people, The İmam-Hatip Schools aimed to form a religious, pious person to save the tradition and religious sentiment against destructive outcomes of westernization. The formation of individuality was the common theme for these three examples, but they also indicate how Turkish process of modernization advanced in different dimensions in the guidance of state. It is interesting to see that even in a strong state habitus, the conflicting and contradicting inclinations are alive, due to the fact that politics is a persistent and determining force de tour in this situation.

Two Dimensions of Turkish Politics: The Coup Tradition and Economy

Turkish politics can be analyzed in many dimensions. Among many, two dimensions stand before the rest, namely so-called coup tradition in Turkey, and a quasicapitalist peripheral economy. The Coup Tradition is a way of seeing the power relations in politics, and the primacy of military in political affairs.

Power elite and its formation in Turkey cannot be examined properly without taking military elite into consideration, and not only short-term political upheavals, but also long-terms political trends and inclinations have been strongly influenced by capitalistic market, it is a necessity to look into economy as a dark horse in the political conglomerations.

The Coup Tradition

The Turkish State was founded by military elite (Mustafa Kemal, Ismet Inönü and Fevzi Cakmak, to name a few), and the mobilization of large uneducated, rural and poor masses was provided by army during the founding act and as result of that, it is not surprising the soldier-nation myth developed by Turkish nationalism has contributed to the normalization of the army involvements at any level.

The organization of modern Turkish army has been carried out in such a settlement that the army has considered itself as the sole inheritor of Kemalism, and wanted to be recognized as only reliable Kemalist subject. The army as the guardian of Kemalism and the Republic used to think itself as having the right to do things outside military affairs. The weakness of Turkish political structure, lack of a strong civil society, flaws in political culture that underestimate politics and politicians in things they do, justified the army and its actions at large.

The Turkish Army directly intervened and changed the structure of political power in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, 2007 and 2016, the last two (2007 and 2016) were not “successful.”

The Consvervative-populist Democrat Party which won with a reasonable % 47 vote percentage, was ousted by the army in 1960, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, and two ministers Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan were executed.

The Coup that took place in 1971 was again a removal of democratically selected government led by Süleyman Demirel’s Justice Party (Adalet PartisiAP).

The most radical and annihilating coup by the army in modern Turkish history was carried out in in 1980 (“12 Eylül Darbesi”). The political parties, associations, journals, civil institutions were closed, too many people were arrested, torture and repression became daily routine, hundreds of people expelled from universities.

28 Şubat or the postmodern coup in 1997 was against Necmettin Erbakan and Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP), it was conducted in such a way that although there was no soldier on the street, the army single handedly controlled everything. The strike on religious associations and organizations was devastating.

In 2016, July 15 “a parallel state”, which denotes a unique case even in for such organizations, established and operated by a hidden network primarily within army, bureaucracy and justice system attempted a coup, bombing Turkish parliamentary and killing many civilians, but, fortunately, this parallel state led by FETÖ (a semi masonic religious puritan organization) could not succeed.

Economy, Not Politics?

There is an undeniable relation between politics and economy, and there are endless debates on what comes first. The option which envisages the mutuality in relation between politics and economy does not solve any problem nor it gives an adequate explanation. Therefore, one option is to look at politics and economy in historical process, and see how they are entwined, how they are interrelated to form a societal totality. The capitalist development in Turkey was a slow process. The early Republic was based on peasantry, which had been in a backward position then. The Marshall Plan was used to mobilise peasantry after World War II. Menderes’s Democrat Party contributed to the petit production networks. The growth of Turkish bourgeoisie and working class gained momentum after 1960. But overall, state was the main source of wealth, and controlling force over financial and productive markets. Throughout 80’s and 90’s the main economic tension between state and bourgeoisie was not limited to the ownership of productive activity, because the volume of production was not enough to build their corresponding spheres, so they acted accordingly, and restrained each other. But today Turkish capitalism is somehow fully articulated into capitalism as a world system if we use Wallerstein’s phrase, therefore it is not economically rational to indulge their political desires. The market, banking system, structure of production and consumption, sensitivity to the global market are stronger than ever in Turkey, but it is still open to discussion how successful and functional they are in their roles as such.