Deneme Sınavı Soruları

To promote its products - to wider audiences - to ensure that they have full knowledge
of their qualities.

To abonden its products - to wider products - to ensure that they have full knowledge
of their qualities.

To abolish its products - to wider audiences - to ensure that they have little knowledge
of their qualities.

To promote its products - to constrict audiences - to ensure that they have less knowledge of their qualities.

To promote its auidences - to lessen products - to ensure that they have full knowledge
of their cheapness.

Ensuring that all mergers between firms in the same relevant market are defined as horizontal mergers. 

Assessing whether the proposed merger will create or strengthen a dominant position significantly impeding effective competition. 

Determining whether the merged firms will exclusively use vertical integration to streamline their distribution channels. 

Evaluating if conglomerate mergers are between firms that do not have complementary products. 

Confirming that all non-horizontal mergers will inherently lead to a significant lessening of competition.

Because market share alone is sufficient to determine the market power of a firm. 

Because only firms with a market share of less than 40% can be considered dominant.

Because other market characteristics and factors such as barriers to entry and buyers' bargaining power also influence a firm's market power. 

Because the concentration level of competitors is irrelevant in assessing dominance. 

Because market share thresholds are universally fixed across all jurisdictions.

Agreements and concerted practices that facilitate or likely facilitate the prevention, distortion, or restriction of competition in a market. 

Any agreement or practice that promotes competition in a particular market for goods or services. 

Agreements, concerted practices, and decisions between undertakings that have no impact on market conditions.

Exclusive dealings that encourage economic welfare by allowing firms to improve efficiency. 

Practices that increase supply amounts and encourage competitive bidding in tenders.

Marginal return on advertising

Marginal return on cost

Marginal benefit on advertising

Marginal benefit on cost

Average return on advertising

It does not alter the market price but increase the quantity

It does not alter the market price but decrease the quantity

It increases both the market price and the quantity

It does not alter the market price and the quantity

It decreases the market price but increase the quantity

Vertical agreements are automatically exempt from block exemption if the parties have a market share greater than 30%. 

Vertical restraints are unregulated in Turkish competition law, allowing for unrestricted manufacturer control over retail pricing. 

Manufacturers are prohibited from setting maximum resale prices or suggesting resale prices to retailers. 

Vertical agreements involving restrictions on sales regions or customers of distributors or retailers generally cannot benefit from block exemption. 

The Turkish Competition Authority encourages vertical agreements that include non-compete obligations indefinitely or for periods extending beyond five years.

The prevalence of single-sided market structures. 

Low significance of network effects on market value. 

The abundance and ease of access to large user data sets. 

Overcoming established intellectual property rights on key technologies.  

Decreasing utility of platforms with the increase in user base.

Product extension - market extension - pure conglomerate

Product offering - market extension - pure market

Demand extension - market extension - pure extension

Product extension - Supply extension - mix conglomerate.

Horizontal extension - market extension - vertical conglomerate

Tie-in sales

Mixed sales

Whole sales

Retail sales

Conditional sales

vertical merger

horizontal merger

cournot dupoly

duopoly

oligopoly

Resale price maintenance

Tying

Territorial restrictions

Exclusive dealing

Implicit dealing

innovation

know-how

static efficiency

dynamic efficiency 

R&D activities

Free entry and exit in the long run

There is only one seller in the market

Each company produces and sells different products

Buyers and sellers have missing information about the market

The firm's determination of the market price alone

An agreement to maximize profits

A written agreement among competitors to stabilize prices

A verbal agreement to lower price levels

An inferred conduct to raise prices

A regulatory action to maintain competitive behavior

Rational competitive behavior

Predatory conduct

Strategic behavior

Structural behavior

Competitive behavior

Perfect competition

Oligopoly

Monopoly

Increased market information

Monopolistic competition

The distribution of firms' size is uniform, and individual firms' market share remains constant over time

The distribution of firms' size is log-normal, and individual firms' market share over time is a deterministic variable.

The distribution of firms' size is random, and individual firms' market share follows a predictable pattern.

The distribution of firms' size is log-normal, and individual firms' market share over time is a random variable.

The distribution of firms' size is exponential, and individual firms' market share tends to increase continuously.

π = 3000, CS = 1500, PS = 2500, DWL = 750

π = 4000, CS = 0, PS = 4000, DWL = 0

π = 3000, CS = 2500, PS = 2500, DWL = 125

π = 3000, CS = 0, PS = 3200, DWL = 0

π = 4000, CS = 4000, PS = 4000, DWL = 4000

An outcome where one player always benefits at the expense of others

An equilibrium where players can deviate without affecting each other's well-being

A situation where all players experience equal gains

An outcome where players can improve their positions without affecting others

An equilibrium where any deviation makes one player better off without affecting others