Politics is the name of the social institution, but an important and functional institution in the reproduction of society. It fills a place within social totality together with other social instutitons, either determining them or determined by them, but in the last instance, it is politics that decides the outcome whether it is a question of religiosity,
of economy, and of social. Every politics includes a value-laden act. Politics in action means subjects, for politics is actualized through subjects, to put it boldly, politics in action requires subjects, who are politically motivated individuals, groups, strata
and classes, and hence become “political subjects.”

Subjectivization is a process the subject becomes itself, but the moment subject accepts itself as it is, an objective crack appears between subject and its representation.

Kulturkampf (“cultural war or struggle”) is a specific term that indicates a specific period (1871-1887) in German history where state tried to gain dominance over church in daily life, especially in marriage and contract issues. The appearance was illusionary; this was not a conflict between “Protestant State” and “Catholic Church” but about who was going to decide even on tiniest trivial matters in daily life, and that political power,
a central authority is executive on every issue in What social life without exemption.

The cultural struggles are important aspects of Turkish political life since the political is always mediated through cultural and ideological practices, and in return, it mediates them.

History makes society, gives its uniqueness, and in that sense, only particular historicities differ societies from each other, and then later every society becomes a part of universal history according to its share in the ruling dynamic of historical development. History, moreover, is a persistent background to everything that happens
within a society. In this sense, Joyce was right: no escape is possible from history, and thus in this sense history becomes fate.

Islamism, Nationalism and Ottomanism, as Yusuf Akçura had formulated, were three modern ideologies that were employed by both state and intelligentsia to save the Ottoman Empire, which was,
then rapidly declining

Socialism especially after 1960 Coup, was rapidly progressing. Socialism was mostly a combination of narodnik populism and an economic program of independent development.

Narodnik, (Russian: “Populist”), member of a 19th century socialist movement in Russia who believed
that political propaganda among the peasantry would lead to the awakening of the masses and,
through their influence, to the liberalization of the tsarist regime. Because Russia was a predominantly
agricultural country, the peasants represented the majority of the people (narod): hence the name
of the movement, narodnichestvo, or “populism”.

The People’s Houses, The Village Institutes and The Imam-Hatip Schools are three different
cultural-social and educational organizations through which Turkey’s quest for Westernization
and the reaction to it, can be examined.

The People’s House was home for secular, urbanite citizen, The Village Institutes was there to create the
enlightening/enlightened pioneer for rural people, The İmam-Hatip Schools aimed to form a religious,
pious person to save the tradition and religious sentiment against destructive outcomes of westernization. The formation of individuality from above through state and its apparatuses was the common theme for these three examples, but they also indicate how Turkish process of modernization advanced in different dimensions in the guidance of state.

Power elite and its formation in Turkey cannot be examined properly without taking military elite into consideration, and not only short-term political upheavels, but also long-terms political trends and inclinations have been strongly influenced by capitalistic market, it is a necessity to look into economy as a dark horse in the political conglomerations.

rural and poor masses was provided by army during the founding act. Later interventions in politics by the army is thus somehow “understandable”, and as result of that, it is not surprising the soldier-nation myth developed by Turkish nationalism has contributed to the normalization of the army involvements at
any level.

The weakness of Turkish political structure, lack of a strong civil society, flaws in political culture that underestimate politics and politicians in things they do, justified the army and its actions at large.

The Turkish Army directly intervened and changed the structure of political power in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, 2007 and 2016, the last two (2007 and 2016) were not “successful.”

Praetorianism: The control of a society by force or fraud, especially when exercised through titular
officials and by a powerful minority.

It is clear that in the early 70’s and 80’s there were teroristic actions by both left and right, the
economic conditions were bad, high inflations made prices untouchable, public administration
was chaotic, the parliament was too soft to take any decision, but both coups did not produce any
positive outcome either economically or politically.

Every student who is “lucky” enough to have a mighty teacher will begin to learn that it is economy
which rules, not politics, so instead of involving in silly and petit political games, one needs to have a
look at “big economic picture.” This seems to be a strong and correct argumentation, indeed it is,
but partly. There is an undeniable relation between politics and economy, and there are endless
debates on what comes first in the last instance, to use Althusserian concept. The third option
which envisages the mutuality in relation between politics and economy does not solve any problem
nor it gives an adequate explanation.

The capitalist development in Turkey was a slow process. The early Republic was based on peasantry,
which had been in a backward position then. The Marshall Plan was used to mobilise peasantry
after World War II. Menderes’s Democrat Party contributed to the petit production networks. The
growth of Turkish bourgeoisie and working class gained momentum after 1960. But overall, state was
the main source of wealth, and controlling force over financial and productive markets.

Throughout 80’s and 90’s the main economic tension between state and bourgeoisie was not limited to the ownership of productive activity, because the volume of production was not enought to build their corresponding spheres, so they acted accordingly, and restrained each other.

The privatization of public economic enterprises, elimination of unions, gentrification, enormous growth of construction industry pictures a scene in which the future of Turkish politics lies.